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A PRIMER ON THE HISTORY AND PROPER 




The divorce rate in the United States is slightly more than one-half of 
the marriage rate. Divorce is a fact of life in this country and will 
likely be so for the foreseeable future. On August 23, 1984, the 
divorce lawyer’s job became more complicated when Congress 
created the Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) as part of 
significant amendments to the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA). QDROs are necessary because prior to the 
1984 amendments to ERISA, many divorced persons discovered that 
they could be deprived of their marital- or community-property 
interest in their former spouses’ retirement plans. For most divorcing 
couples, the two largest assets of the marriage are the marital home 
and retirement accounts. Over ninety-nine million persons 
participate in private-sector retirement plans, and those plans’ assets 
total more than $4 trillion, which exceeds the total value of all 
residential real estate in the United States. Dividing retirement 
accounts is not as simple as a court ordering that each party gets 
one-half of the other party’s account. It takes a properly drafted 
QDRO to make sure that each party gets his or her marital or 
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community-property share of the other’s retirement benefits. Drafting 
a QDRO can be time consuming, complex, and frustrating, in part 
because it requires lawyers who primarily practice state law to have 
a working knowledge of parts of the notoriously lengthy and complex 
ERISA. A substantial number—perhaps a majority—of QDROs are 
not prepared properly because they do not reflect the parties’ 
understanding of what they were awarded in the divorce proceeding. 
In fact, a former administrator for a retirement plan stated that 
between 15% and 20% of the time, lawyers fail to see a QDRO 
through to completion. This Article will detail the history leading to 
the creation of QDROs, explain what QDROs are, and offer 
suggestions on what pitfalls to look for and avoid in drafting them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, 2,080,000 couples were married in the United States.1 
That same year, 840,000 couples were divorced.2 Many divorces 
                                                 
 1. NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS SYS.,CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, NAT’L MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE RATE TRENDS (2010), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm (last updated Jan. 12, 
2012) [hereinafter NAT’L MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE RATE TRENDS]. The national 
rate of marriages per 1,000 persons is 6.8. Id. The rates of marriages per 1,000 
persons in the individual states and the District of Columbia (in descending order) 
are: Nevada (38.3), Hawaii (17.6), Arkansas (10.8), Vermont (9.3), Idaho (8.8), 
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require the division of marital assets, which may be done differently 
depending on whether the couple resides in a community-property 
state3 or a common-law-property state.4 In community-property 
                                                                                                                 
Tennessee (8.8), Utah (8.5), Alabama (8.2), Alaska (8), New Mexico (7.7), District 
of Columbia (7.6), Wyoming (7.6), Kentucky (7.4), Montana (7.4), South Carolina 
(7.4), South Dakota (7.3), New Hampshire (7.3), Florida (7.3), Georgia (7.3), 
Oklahoma (7.2), Maine (7.1), Texas (7.1), Colorado (6.9), Louisiana (6.9), Iowa 
(6.9), Virginia (6.8), West Virginia (6.7), Nebraska (6.6), North Carolina (6.6), 
Missouri (6.5), New York (6.5), North Dakota (6.5), Oregon (6.5), Kansas (6.4), 
Indiana (6.3), Washington (6), Arizona (5.9), Ohio (5.8), Rhode Island (5.8), 
California (5.8), Illinois (5.7), Maryland (5.7), Connecticut (5.6), Massachusetts 
(5.6), Michigan (5.5), Minnesota (5.3), Pennsylvania (5.3), Wisconsin (5.3), 
Delaware (5.2), New Jersey (5.1), and Mississippi (4.9). NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS 
SYS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, MARRIAGE RATES BY STATE: 
1990, 1995, AND 1999–2010 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ 
nvss/marriage_rates_90_95_99-10.pdf (last visited Jan, 12, 2012) [hereinafter 
MARRIAGE RATES BY STATE]. 
 2. NAT’L MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE RATE TRENDS, supra note 1. The national 
rate of divorces per 1,000 persons is 3.5. Id. The national divorce count and rate are 
higher than reported because California, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, and 
Minnesota do not report either divorce counts or rates. Betzaida Tejada-Vera & 
Paul D. Sutton, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for 
2009, 58 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Aug. 2010, at 1, 2. The rates of Divorces per 
1,000 persons in individual states and the District of Columbia (in descending 
order) are: Nevada (5.9), Arkansas (5.7), Oklahoma (5.2), Idaho (5.2), Wyoming 
(5.1), West Virginia (5.1), Alaska (4.7), Kentucky (4.5), Alabama (4.4), Florida 
(4.4), Mississippi (4.3), Colorado (4.3), Maine (4.2) Washington (4.2), Tennessee 
(4.2), Missouri (3.9), Montana (3.9), New Mexico (4.0), Oregon (4.0), North 
Carolina (3.8), New Hampshire (3.8), Vermont (3.8), Virginia (3.8), Kansas (3.7), 
Utah (3.7), Nebraska (3.6), Michigan (3.5), Arizona (3.5), Delaware (3.5), 
Delaware (3.5), Ohio (3.4), South Dakota (3.4), Texas (3.3), Rhode Island (3.2), 
North Dakota (3.1), South Carolina (3.1), Wisconsin (3.0), New Jersey (3.0), 
Connecticut (2.9), New York (2.9), Maryland (2.8), District of Columbia (2.8), 
Pennsylvania (2.7), Illinois (2.6), Massachusetts (2.5), Iowa (2.4). MARRIAGE 
RATES BY STATE, supra note 1. 
 3. The eight community-property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, 
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Cheyañna L. Jaffke, 
Death, Taxes, and Now Divorce—The Dyad Expands to a Triad: ERISA’s Social 
Policy Harms Women’s Rights, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 255, 268 (2001) (citations 
omitted). Wisconsin has elements of a community-property regime, but it is not a 
formal community-property state. Id. (citing Howard S. Erlanger & June M. 
Weisberger, From Common Law Property to Community Property: Wisconsin’s 
Marital Property Act Four Years Later, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 769, 769 n.2 (1990)). 
 4. See Jaffke, supra note 3, at 268. The remaining states are common-law-
property states. Id. 
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states, marriage is considered an equal partnership; therefore, any 
asset acquired during the marriage belongs to both spouses, which 
entitles each spouse to a one-half ownership interest in the asset.5 
Any effort expended during the marriage that results in an acquisition 
of property produces something that belongs to both spouses, 
regardless of which spouse expended the effort to acquire it.6 
A majority of the common-law-property states operate similarly 
to the community-property states in that assets obtained during the 
marriage are presumed to be marital, which means that each spouse 
owns one-half of the asset.7 This presumption may be rebutted; 
however, if a court determines that an equal division of marital 
property would be inequitable in a particular case, then the court may 
order an unequal division.8 
In most divorces, the two largest assets that couples own are the 
marital home and retirement funds.9 Division of a marital home is 
                                                 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 269. 
 8. See Id. 
 9. David Clayton Carrad, The Complete QDRO Handbook: Dividing ERISA, 
Military, and Civil Service Pensions and Collecting Child Support from Employee 
Benefit Plans xxvii (3d ed. A.B.A. 2009); Joshua A. Dean, Wilson v. Wilson: The Effect 
of QDROs on Appealing Divorce Decrees, 42 AKRON L. REV. 639, 639 n.1 (2009) 
(citing David L. Baumer & J.C. Poindexter, Women and Divorce: The Perils of Pension 
Division, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 203, 204 (1996)). “[P]ension plans contain the largest block of 
private capital” in the United States. Id. (citing Hilary Greer Fike, Qualified Pension 
Trends and Divorce Considerations, 14 AM. J. FAM. L. 234, 234–35 (2000)). In 2000, 
the Federal Reserve estimated that pension funds held 25% of the United States’ 
financial assets compared with 2% in 1950. Hilary Greer Fike, Qualified Pension Trends 
and Divorce Considerations, 14 AM. J. FAM. L. 234, 234–35 (2000). In 2000, the total 
value of pension assets exceeded the total value of all residential real estate. Id. “[T]he 
average American couple has pension assets that are worth as much as the gross value of 
their (sic) home.” Id. at 235; Mark S. Maddox & Margaret K. Cassidy, Division of 
Employee Benefits upon Divorce: An Analysis of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 and 
a Framework for Distribution of Benefits, 58 OHIO ST. B. ASS’N REP. 436, 436 (1985) 
(stating that, in many divorces, the pension rights or employee benefits of one or both 
spouses are the most significant marital assets owned by the couple and are subject to 
division in divorce proceedings); Jessica Straub, Note, Erb v. Erb: A Step Toward 
Clarification in Public Pension Division, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 915, 916 (2002) (stating 
that pension plans are crucial in divorces because they, along with the marital home, are 
often the largest marital asset); Dylan A. Wilde, Article, Obtaining an Equitable 
Distribution of Retirement Plans in a Divorce Proceeding, 49 S.D. L. REV. 141, 141 
(2003) (stating that a 1998 United States Department of Labor study indicated that over 
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governed by state domestic-relations law and is not a factually or legally 
complex undertaking. A court could, for example, grant ownership of the 
home to one spouse on the condition that he or she “buy out” the other 
spouse’s one-half interest. Conversely, a court could order the marital 
home to be sold with the parties equally dividing the proceeds. 
Retirement plans, however, are not so neatly or easily divided. 
The division of a retirement plan as an incident of divorce must 
comply not only with state domestic-relations law, but also with 
federal law, namely the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA)10 and the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA).11 
Under ERISA12 and the REA, a person’s pension benefits can only be 
assigned to another person if the state-court domestic-relations 
order—an order recognizing the right of a spouse, former spouse, 
child, or other dependent to receive a part or all of an individual’s 
                                                                                                                 
ninety-nine million persons participated in private retirement plans, and those plans’ 
assets total more than $4 trillion); U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, QDROs: The Division of 
Retirement Benefits Through Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, DOL.GOV, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/qdros.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). More than 
forty-six million private-sector workers have employer-provided retirement plans, and 
for many of these workers, these plans represent one of their most significant assets. Id. 
 10. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 219, 408, 410–415, 4971, 4973–
4975, 6047, 6057–6059, 6690, 6692, 6693, 7476 (2006); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1003, 
1021–1031, 1051–1056, 1058–1061, 1081–1085, 1101–1114, 1131–1151, 1161–
1169, 1181–1183, 1185, 1185a–1185d, 1191, 1191a–1191c, 1201–1204, 1221, 
1222, 1231, 1232, 1241, 1242, 1301–1310, 1321, 1322, 1322a, 1322b, 1341, 
1341a, 1342–1348, 1350, 1361–1371, 1381–1405, 1411–1415, 1421–1426, 1431, 
1441, 1451–1453, 1461 (2006)). This law spans two titles and 192 sections of the 
United States Code (nineteen sections in Title 26, the Internal Revenue Code, and 
173 sections in Title 29, Labor). Id. President Gerald R. Ford signed ERISA into 
law on Labor Day, September 2, 1974. 10 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1084 (Sept. 
9, 1974). 
 11. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified 
as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 72, 1054, 401, 402, 410, 411, 414, 417, 6057, 6652 
(2006); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1025, 1052–56, 1144 (2006)). Id. President Ronald 
Reagan signed the REA into law on August 23, 1984. 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1161 (Sept. 3, 1984). 
 12. Reading this article is going to require putting up with a lot of acronyms. 
Trs. of the Dirs. Guild of Am.–Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 
415, 419 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that an analysis of ERISA’s QDRO provision is a 
task requiring tolerance for acronyms). 
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pension benefits—constitutes a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
(QDRO).13 
Two facts make QDROs necessary in virtually every divorce 
proceeding. First, there are over 800,000 ERISA-qualified retirement 
plans in the United States, and those plans contain over $4 trillion in 
assets for more than ninety million workers.14 Second, the current 
divorce rate is more than one-half of the current marriage rate.15 
Simply put, those who practice domestic-relations law need to know 
how to draft and construe a QDRO. This requires more than 
uncritically filling in the blanks of a QDRO obtained from a form 
book or an individual’s retirement-plan administrator. Failure to 
properly handle QDRO issues is professional misconduct that can 
result in malpractice liability.16 In the last ten years, more and more 
attorneys have been exposed to malpractice liability due to their 
failure to handle QDROs appropriately.17 David Clayton Carrad, a 
preeminent QDRO authority in the United States, has posited the 
following four reasons for this trend.18 
First, an understanding of QDROs requires some understanding 
of certain parts of ERISA, a notoriously lengthy, complex, and 
detailed set of statutes that span two titles and 192 sections of the 
United States Code.19 Although a person does not need to be 
conversant with the entirety of ERISA to properly handle a QDRO, 
those parts that a person does need to understand can be difficult to 
                                                 
 13. 26 U.S.C. § 414(p)(1) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (2006). 
 14. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 2 (citing EVERETT T. ALLEN ET. AL., PENSION 
PLANNING: PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, AND OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
PLANS 437–38 (8th ed. 1997)). 
 15. See supra notes 1, 2. The national rate of marriages per 1,000 persons is 
6.8; the national divorce rate per 1,000 persons is 3.5. Id. 
 16. See CARRAD, supra note 9, at 3, 96, 172–74; see also GARY A. SHULMAN, 
QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER HANDBOOK §§ 16.01–.08 (3d ed. 2011). 
 17. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 16.01. 
 18. See CARRAD, supra note 9, at 6–7. 
 19. See supra notes 10–11; see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 
251, 262 (1993) (describing ERISA as “a ‘comprehensive and reticulated statute,’ 
the product of a decade of congressional study of the Nation’s private employee 
benefit system[,]” and “an enormously complex and detailed statute that resolved 
innumerable disputes between powerful competing interests” (quoting Nachman 
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980))). 
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comprehend.20 ERISA can bedevil even those who work with it on a 
daily basis, let alone a domestic-relations practitioner who addresses 
it only in connection with a divorce.  
Second, ERISA grants employers wide discretion to design a 
variety of employee-retirement plans provided that certain minimum 
standards are met.21 Plans differ greatly with respect to benefits, 
options, terms, and procedures, which makes it difficult to create a 
template to use for subsequent clients.22 Third, QDROs require the 
application of labor law, state domestic-relations law, and federal tax 
law.23 Drafting a QDRO that complies with state law, federal law, 
and the wishes of the client is no easy task.24 Fourth, the emotions of 
divorcing spouses occasionally turn bitter or vindictive, which may 
prolong the QDRO drafting and approval process.25 After all, if a 
marriage that one thought would last a lifetime is coming to an end, 
then one of the last things a divorcee might want to see is a sizeable 
part of his retirement funds assigned to a former spouse. 
These four factors make drafting a QDRO and getting it approved 
and effectuated an undertaking fraught with the potential for costly 
missteps. Doing it right is time consuming, frustrating, and 
expensive.26 The purpose of this Article is to detail the history 
leading to the creation of QDROs, to explain what QDROs are, and 
to assist QDRO drafters so that they avoid the mistakes that are all 
too common in this aspect of domestic-relations practice. As difficult 
as understanding and drafting QDROs can be, they are not beyond 
the ken of lawyers who are willing to devote the time, skill, and effort 
to learn to prepare them correctly. 
Part I of this Article will recount the status of employee pensions 
and retirement plans that pre-date ERISA and the effect of ERISA on 
                                                 
 20. See generally CARRAD, supra note 9, at 11–29 (showing the comprehensive 
nature of ERISA and QDROs). 
 21. Id. at 6. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 6–7. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Id. at 7. 
 26. In re Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1997). The QDRO process is 
time consuming, something Congress itself acknowledges. Dean, supra note 9, at 
642 (citing Aaron Klein, Note, Divorce, Death, and Posthumous QDROs: When Is 
it Too Late for a Divorcee to Claim Pension Benefits Under ERISA? 26 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1651, 1654 (2005) (stating that the process of drafting a QDRO and getting 
it approved is long and complex)). 
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protecting the retirement-income security of American workers. Part 
II will explain the REA and how it filled gaps left open by ERISA. 
Part III will explain what a QDRO is, including definitions of key 
terms that are employed by those involved in the QDRO process. Part 
IV will identify errors and omissions in QDROs that most often lead 
to professional misconduct, malpractice liability, and client 
dissatisfaction. This Article will not only identify these pitfalls—it 
will offer concrete suggestions on how to avoid them.27 
                                                 
 27. See CARRAD, supra note 9, at 3, 96, 172–74; SHULMAN, supra note 16, §§ 
16.01–.08; Paul L. Behling, Not All Domestic Relations Orders Satisfy QDRO 
Rules, 55 TAX’N FOR ACCT. 337, 339–42 (1995); Margaret R. Cooper, A Family 
Practitioner’s Guide to Overcoming QDRO Phobia, 8 DEL. L. REV. 213, 214–23 
(2006); Fike, supra note 9, at 235; Leslie A. Kulick, What Are the Limitations on 
QDROs? 61 J. MO. B. 89, 89–91 (2005); Emily W. McBurney, Failure To Handle 
Qualified Domestic Relations Orders Properly, 38033 NAT’L BUS. INST. 117, 121–
36 (2007); Robert Preston, Strategies To Help Drafters Avoid Common Traps in 
Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST, Jan. 2002, at 1, 
1–3; Sherwin P. Simmons & Roberta Casper Watson, Common Errors in the 
Preparation of Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, FAIRSHARE: THE 
MATRIMONIAL L. MONTHLY, Dec. 1987, at 3, 3–5; Timothy C. Voit & James L. 
Parris, Fundamentals of Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, S. C. LAW. 
May/June 2001, at 24, 25–30; Drafting Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, 17 
No. 3 EQUITABLE DISTRIB. J. 25, Mar. 2000; Jerry Reiss, Dividing Pension 
Property: Underrated Malpractice Concerns, 16 No. 7 DIVORCE LITIG. 116, July 
2004; Sherwin P. Simmons, Tax Matters and QDROs in the Context of Dissolution 
of Marriage Proceedings, CB02 ALI-ABA1267, 1288–1301, July 8, 1996; The Top 
Ten QDRO Mistakes, 19 No. 6 EQUITABLE DISTRIB. J. 68, June 2002; Brett R. 
Turner, The Mechanics of Dividing Retirement Benefits: Recent Case Law on 
Preparation of Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, 10 No. 6 DIVORCE LITIG.105, 
June 1998; see also Paul L. Behling, Not all Domestic Relations Orders Satisfy 
QDRO Rules, 24 TAX’N FOR LAW. 212, 214–17 (1996); Sherwin P. Simmons, Tax 
Matters and QDROs in the Context of Dissolution of Marriage Proceedings, SC06 
ALI-ABA 1203, 1224–38, June 30, 1997. 
  This Article does not address non-ERISA plans such as federal civil-service 
pensions, military pensions, and state- and local-government pensions, nor does it 
explain how to draft a QDRO in its entirety. For one interested in those subjects, 
these are other excellent resources: CARRAD, supra note 9; SHULMAN, supra note 
16; MICHAEL B. SNYDER, QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDERS (2d ed. 2011); 
and QDROs: The Division of Retirement Benefits Through Qualified Domestic 
Relations Orders, supra note 9. Some have suggested consulting “A Handbook for 
Attorneys on Court Ordered Retirement, Health Benefits and Life Insurance under 
the Civil Service Retirement Benefits, Federal Employees Retirement Benefits, 
Federal Employees Health Benefits, and Federal Employees Group Life Insurance 
Program.” This handbook is available from the United States Office of Personnel 
Management and can be downloaded from http://www.opm.gov 
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I. THE STATUS OF EMPLOYEE PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT PLANS 
BEFORE ERISA 
A. The Studebaker Shutdown 
The December 9, 1963, shutdown of the Studebaker automobile 
plant in South Bend, Indiana, 28 is widely considered to be the 
catalyst that led to the enactment of ERISA.29 
                                                                                                                 
/retire/pubs/pamphlets/ri83-116.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). I do not quarrel 
with those who suggest reviewing this handbook, but I do not think much good 
would come of it because it is 137 pages of inscrutable prose (look at the title for 
goodness’ sake). David Clayton Carrad described it thusly, “[W]hile it is thorough 
and comprehensive, the handbook is written in a turgid and tedious bureaucratic 
style.” CARRAD, supra note 9, at 200. Emily W. McBurney echoed the sentiment: 
“An extraordinarily complex and confusing publication . . . . This handbook is 
notorious because it is nearly impenetrable.” Emily W. McBurney, Failure to 
Handle Qualified Domestic Relations Orders Properly, 38033 NAT’L BUS. INST. 
117, 132 (2007). 
 28. James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: 
The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 
683, 683–701, 716, 726–39 (2001). 
 29. Private Pension Plans: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Pol’y of 
the Joint Econ. Comm., 89th Cong. 128 (1966); H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 13, 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4680–81; Stuart N. Alperin, David H. 
Eisenstat, Gail A. Kreusch & Gordon W. Netzorg, The Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 541, 
548, 563–64, 609, 620 (1975); Dean, supra note 9, at 646–47; Jaffke, supra note 3, 
at 256–57, 260–61; Sharon Reece, The Gilded Gates of Pension Protection: 
Amending the Anti-Alienation Provision of ERISA Section 206(d), 80 OR. L. REV. 
379, 382 (2001). 
  The “Studebaker Incident” is not the sole reason Congress enacted ERISA. 
See PAUL J. SCHNEIDER & BRIAN M. PINHEIRO, ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 
§ 1.03 (3d ed., 2008). On December 31, 1969, three persons hired by the United 
Mine Workers of America (UMWA) murdered Joseph “Jock” Yablonski, age fifty-
nine; his wife, Margaret, age fifty-nine; and their daughter, Charlotte, age twenty-
five, in their Washington County, Pennsylvania, home. Richard Robbins, 1969 
Yablonski murders spurred union reforms, Dec. 27, 2009, TRIBLIVE, 
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/regional/s_%20659597.html#. 
The murders followed Mr. Yablonski’s loss in a vigorously contested election for 
the presidency of the UMWA. Id. The murders sparked a public outcry and led to 
an investigation by the Labor Subcommittee of the United States Senate. 
SCHNEIDER & PINHEIRO, § 1.03. Because Tony Boyle, the incumbent UMWA 
president, faced accusations “of misuse of union health and retirement funds,” the 
subcommittee conducted a general study of pension and welfare funds, with a 
special emphasis on employee protection. Id. Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York, 
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In 1945, approximately one-fifth of private-sector employees had 
pension plans, and only a fraction had collectively bargained plans.30 
In the late 1940s, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the 
United Auto Workers (UAW), and the United Steelworkers led the 
“‘Great Gold Rush of ’49,’” which resulted in pensions for millions 
of union employees, “including production workers at the 
Studebaker” automobile plant and the Packard Motor Car 
Company.31 The push for pension benefits resulted from the post-
World War II economic boom and the aging labor force.32 During the 
war, “many businesses encouraged older workers” to keep working, 
and some businesses asked retirees to return to the work force.33 The 
war added significantly to unions’ membership rolls, while wartime 
inflation eroded the purchasing power of social security.34 
Consequently, many older workers delayed leaving the workforce, 
which resulted in “‘[m]ost companies . . . hav[ing] a greater 
proportion of men over [age sixty-five] in their service than at any 
time in their history.’”35 
In September 1949, the UAW and Ford Motor Company agreed 
to a pension plan for hourly employees, and, following a strike, the 
steel companies followed suit.36 Studebaker adopted a defined-
benefit pension plan in June 1950, and Packard Motor Car Company 
                                                                                                                 
a leader in the pension-reform movement in the Senate, led the investigation, and it 
resulted in findings that caused such an outrage that political opposition to pension 
reform seemed repellent. Id. Those findings included “losses caused by harsh 
vesting provisions, lax funding” of plans, and the lack of portable insurance 
programs. Id. The pension reform had its opponents, including renowned consumer 
advocate Ralph Nader, who opined that the ERISA bill constituted “a 
‘comprehensive fraud’ incapable of securing its goal” because of heavy-handed 
editing by the Finance Committee of the United States Senate. Id. Notwithstanding 
the opposition, ERISA passed, and President Gerald R. Ford signed it into law on 
Labor Day, 1974. Id. § 1.01. 
 30. Wooten, supra note 28, at 686. 
 31. Id. at 686–87. 
 32. Id. at 687. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (quoting M. F. Lipton, Trends in Company Pension Plans, in NAT’L 
INDUS. CONF. BOARD, STUDIES IN PERSONNEL POL’Y, No. 67, at 8 (1944)) 
(alterations in original). 
 36. Wooten, supra note 28, at 690. 
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did the same two months later.37 Under the Studebaker plan, 
employees’ pension credit was calculated at the rate of $1.50 per 
month for each year that an employee worked for the company up to 
a maximum of thirty years.38 The collectively bargained agreement 
set a voluntary retirement age of sixty-five and a mandatory 
retirement age of sixty-eight, but it allowed for early retirement at 
sixty if the employee had ten years of service.39 To fund the plan, 
Studebaker made contributions to a pension trust.40 Making those 
contributions, however, did not obligate Studebaker to actually pay 
the retirement benefits because the company limited its legal liability 
solely to making trust contributions.41 Contributions to the pension 
trusts, however, came at a cost; money paid into the trust did not get 
paid as wages.42 The size of these contributions depended on the 
magnitude of the pension benefits and the eligibility requirements 
employees had to meet to receive those benefits.43 The UAW and 
Studebaker agreement included generous pensions to retiring 
employees, so in order to hold down costs, the union agreed to strict 
eligibility requirements.44 This meant that as the auto manufacturers 
encountered financial difficulties in the 1950s, younger workers 
risked losing their pensions.45 Studebaker and Packard were 
prospering when they made pension agreements with the UAW, but 
that prosperity would prove to be short-lived.46 
In 1953, the automobile industry faced a recession and the end of 
the postwar seller’s market for cars.47 Packard lost money in the 
second half of 1953, and although Studebaker made a profit, it was 
significantly less than the prior reporting period.48 In October 1954, 
Packard and Studebaker merged in an effort to stanch the financial 
                                                 
 37. Id. at 691. See Part III.A, infra, for a more detailed description of defined-
benefit plans. 
 38. Wooten, supra note 28, at 691. 
 39. Id. at 691–92. 
 40. Id. at 692. 
 41. See Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 692–93. 
 47. Id. at 693. 
 48. Id. 
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hemorrhaging.49 The merger revealed the fiscal infirmities 
underpinning the UAW’s 1949 and 1950 collectively bargained 
retirement plans.50 Even though those plans gave employees pension 
credit at the rate of $1.50 per month for up to thirty years of service, 
accruing that credit did not entitle an employee to receive a 
pension.51 Under the Studebaker plan, an employee had to be eligible 
for retirement under the terms of the plan before he received a right 
to a pension; if the employee resigned or was terminated, then he 
received nothing.52 This was no accident.53 The UAW bargained for 
this term with the understanding that, in a plan with limited funding, 
a less restrictive vesting provision meant that more workers would be 
eligible for benefits; this meant less generous benefits for workers 
who qualified to receive benefits under the plan.54 The Union 
prioritized higher benefits for older workers to induce them to retire, 
resulting in more job security for younger workers.55 This increase in 
job security, however, meant that younger workers assumed a greater 
risk that they would forfeit their pensions if they did not remain 
employed by Studebaker until they reached age sixty with at least ten 
years of service.56 
In 1955, the UAW negotiated a plan that made its workers fully 
vested in their pensions if they completed a decade of service after 
reaching the age of twenty-nine.57 The union sought to insulate 
inactive, laid off, or displaced workers from forfeiting their pension 
credits if they had not reached retirement age.58 This left younger 
workers with a greater sense of pension security, but events at 
Studebaker-Packard would soon show that those benefits “were less 
secure than they seemed.”59  
In a properly funded pension plan, the employer funds pension 
obligations in advance by setting aside money as employees earn 
                                                 
 49. Id. at 694. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 695. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Id. 
 57. Id. at 697. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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credit.60 The plans between the UAW and the automobile 
manufacturers were not funded in this fashion—dooming the plans 
from the start.61 Management and the unions created pension plans 
that promised benefits that far exceeded the resources devoted to 
paying them.62 Additionally, whenever the parties negotiated 
increases in retirement benefits, those increases created more 
unfunded obligations, which exacerbated the original funding 
problem.63 An employer’s ability to fulfill its pension-funding 
obligations depended solely on the health of its balance sheet, so if a 
company experienced financial difficulty—which Studebaker-
Packard eventually did—the costs of funding pensions would become 
unsustainable.64 
When Studebaker and Packard merged in October 1954, they 
were both in fiscal distress.65 In the third quarter of 1954, Studebaker 
lost nearly $14 million, and Packard failed to meet its expenses by 
nearly $12 million.66 In January and February of 1956, Packard’s car 
sales dropped 67% from their 1955 level.67 For much of 1956, 
“Studebaker-Packard teetered on the edge of bankruptcy . . . . It 
narrowly averted liquidation by selling its defense business and 
leasing several manufacturing facilities to Curtiss-Wright 
Corporation for about $37 million.”68 From that point forward, 
Studebaker-Packard’s sole domestic automobile-production facility 
was the plant in South Bend, Indiana.69 In 1957, Studebaker-Packard 
did not lose as much money as it did in 1956; however, the 
company’s financial condition remained precarious.70 In 1958, the 
economy went through another recession, and the company failed to 
make the first few payments on a $55 million long-term debt.71 The 
prospects for the company’s continued existence seemed poor, so the 
                                                 
 60. Id. at 699. 
 61. See id. at 698. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 694, 698. 
 66. Id. at 698. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 699. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 706–07. 
 71. Id. at 707. 
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company’s executives decided to terminate the Packard employees’ 
pension plan.72 
Prior to the October 1954 merger, Studebaker and Packard each 
used pension trusts to fund their respective retirement plans.73 
Following the merger, the UAW insisted that the Studebaker and 
Packard pension plans merge as well (which management agreed to 
do) so the plans combined in 1955.74 Although the pension plans 
merged in 1955, the pension trusts that financed the plans did not.75 
“In fact, company officials maintained separate trusts with different 
banks serving as trustee. The firm’s actuaries continued to calculate 
separate pension liability for the Studebaker and Packard 
divisions.”76 This meant that the Studebaker trust paid pensions to 
Studebaker retirees, and the Packard trust paid pensions to Packard 
retirees.77 At the end of 1957, the Packard trust had $9.6 million in 
assets and approximately $27 million in pension liabilities.78 
Notwithstanding a deficit in excess of $17 million, the Packard trust 
continued to pay retirees 100% of their pension benefits.79 This 
arrangement came to an end in January 1959 after Studebaker-
Packard and the local union agreed to a reduction in benefits while 
awaiting the outcome of a lawsuit over the validity of the termination 
of the Packard plan.80 In October 1959, Studebaker-Packard and the 
UAW settled the lawsuit, and under the terms of the agreement, 
Packard retirees received 85% of the benefits that they would have 
received before the termination of the plan.81 Retirement-eligible 
Packard employees who applied for a pension after September 2, 
1958, received a lump-sum payment of about $43 per year of 
service.82 
                                                 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 709. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 709–10. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 710. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 716. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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In 1961, the Studebaker trust had $19.2 million in assets and 
owed $22 million in promised benefits.83 In the meantime, the 
company continued to struggle to make a profit.84 In 1962 and 1963, 
the company diversified through non-automotive acquisitions in the 
hope of relying less on automobile production for its economic 
sustenance.85 Because of the acquisitions, the company showed a 
profit in 1962, but not in the automotive division.86 Although 1963 
proved to be a banner year for the car industry, Studebaker-Packard’s 
automotive division’s losses in the first half of the year exceeded the 
profits generated by all of the company’s other divisions by $7.5 
million.87 On December 9, 1963, Studebaker-Packard announced the 
closing of the South Bend, Indiana, plant.88 Six weeks later, the 
company announced that Studebaker retirees and retirement-eligible 
employees would receive their full pension benefits.89 Other 
Studebaker workers would not be as fortunate.90 The pension 
liabilities of the Studebaker pension trust exceeded its assets by $15 
million, which meant that the retirement funds of 4,392 existing and 
former Studebaker employees stood to be extinguished.91 
Leaders of the local union stated that the pension plan represented 
a private promise by the company that it had a social, moral, and 
equitable obligation to keep.92 When the company did not keep that 
promise, the union and its members had little recourse.93 On October 
15, 1964, the company and the local union entered into an agreement 
that terminated the Studebaker pension plan.94 The agreement called 
for current retirees and workers over the age of sixty who were 
                                                 
 83. Id. at 728. 
 84. Id. at 729. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 729–30. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 730–31. 
 93. Id. “[T]he UAW filed a grievance[, arguing that] the shutdown violated the 
collective-bargaining agreement with [the local union].” Id. Even if the union had 
prevailed, it would have been a Pyrrhic victory because the pension trust simply 
lacked the funds necessary to pay all of its obligations. Id. The trust was judgment-
proof. Id.  
 94. Id. 
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eligible to retire to receive 100% of their pension benefits.95 Workers 
under the age of sixty, some of whom had worked for the company 
for forty years, received a lump sum worth approximately 15% of the 
full value of their pension.96 Workers under age forty and those who 
were not fully vested in their retirement plans received nothing.97 
The shuttering of the Studebaker plant has been described as “‘the 
most glorious story of failure in the business’” because it pushed the 
topic of pension-termination insurance squarely into the public debate 
on pension reform.98 
B. The Long, Wending Path to Pension-Termination Insurance 
Because of the flawed funding mechanism and the lack of 
insurance that could be used to cover losses, neither the UAW nor the 
government could do much to stop the Studebaker pension plan from 
defaulting on its obligations to the thousands of workers who relied 
on the promise of retirement-income security.99 A few years before 
the collapse of the plan, public officials and private-sector pension 
experts considered federal legislative proposals to protect workers in 
private pension plans.100 Specifically, this legislation proposed that 
insurance “would pay the difference between the cost of some or all 
of the benefits [a] plan promised and the value of . . . plan assets 
available to pay those benefits.”101 In 1958, Congress began 
regulating private-sector employee-benefit plans when it passed the 
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.102 In March 1962, 
President John F. Kennedy established the President’s Committee on 
Corporate Pension Funds to study the country’s private pension 
plans.103 Union leaders urged the Committee to recommend the 
                                                 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 686. 
 99. See id. at 732. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 723. 
 102. Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 
(repealed 1976). Congress limited the scope of this law to disclosure only. Jaffke, 
supra note 3, at 260. The law did not set minimums with respect to funding or 
employee participation, nor did it establish fiduciary responsibilities for plan 
administrators. Id. 
 103. Wooten, supra note 28, at 732. 
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establishment of pension-termination insurance, but “[w]hen the 
Committee submitted an interim report in November 1962, it did not 
recommend legislation to create [pension-termination insurance] 
because of concerns about the feasibility of insuring private 
pensions.”104 The “Committee did, however, urge further study of the 
idea[, and i]n January 1963 [President] Kennedy [tasked] another 
committee—the President’s Labor-Management Advisory 
Committee—to review the report of the Committee on Corporate 
Pension Funds.”105 This committee did not recommend establishing 
pension-termination insurance.106 
Refusing to let a crisis go to waste, union officials recognized that 
the publicity from the shutdown of the Studebaker plant provided an 
excellent opportunity to revive the issue of pension-termination 
insurance; therefore, they persuaded Walter Reuther, the UAW 
president and a member of the Labor Management Advisory 
Committee, to raise the South Bend shutdown and the need for 
pension-termination insurance with President Lyndon B. Johnson at a 
January 1964 meeting.107 President Johnson did not embrace the idea 
of insurance because he needed business leaders’ support for his 
election campaign, and he did not want to expend political capital on 
a proposal that might antagonize them.108 
Having failed to persuade President Johnson to champion their 
cause, proponents of pension-termination insurance turned to Senator 
Rupert Vance Hartke of Indiana.109 Senator Hartke introduced the 
Federal Reinsurance of Private Pensions Act on August 3, 1964,110 
suggesting that the Studebaker plant shutdown proved that workers 
needed pension-termination insurance.111 The shutdown played a 
prominent role in the discussions of pension reform and pension-
                                                 
 104. Id. at 733. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 733–34. 
 108. Id. at 734. 
 109. Id.  
 110. S. 3071, 88th Cong. (1964); Wooten, supra note 28, at 734–35. The term 
“reinsurance” in the title is a misnomer. Id. at 734. The proposal was not intended 
to “reinsure” anything. Id. at 734. Union officials insisted that the term be used to 
make the proposal more politically palatable. Id. at 734–35. 
 111. Wooten, supra note 28, at 735. 
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termination insurance.112 Having comfortably won the 1964 
election,113 President “Johnson[’s] administration [started] preparing 
pension reform legislation in 1966” that included termination 
insurance.114 In 1967, Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York 
introduced a bill similar to a modified version of Senator Hartke’s 
1964 bill.115 In 1968, a bill sponsored by the Department of Labor 
was introduced that included pension-termination insurance.116 In 
1970, a staff member of the House Committee on Education and 
Labor said that the Studebaker shutdown spurred Congressional 
action in the private-pension arena like the mine explosion in 
Farmington, West Virginia, had provided an impetus for Congress to 
enact the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. A labor 
lobbyist compared it to “‘the Triangle fire episode that led to the 
[regulation of] sweatshops in the garment industry.’”117 
Notwithstanding all of the legislative and political activity around the 
issues of the Studebaker shutdown, pension reform, and pension-
termination insurance, ERISA as we know it did not become the law 
of the land until November 2, 1974—more than a decade after the 
collapse of the Studebaker plant and its employees’ pension plan.118 
                                                 
 112. Id. (citing Michael Allen, The Studebaker Incident and its Influence on the 
Private Pension Plan Reform Movement, in JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, 
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 68, 70 (3d ed. 2000)). 
 113. On November 3, 1964, President Johnson defeated Senator Barry 
Goldwater of Arizona 486 electoral votes to fifty-two. Nat’l Archives & Record 
Admin., Historical Election Results, available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/electoral-college/scores.html#1964 (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). President 
Johnson received 43,129,566 (61.34%) popular votes to Senator Goldwater’s 
27,178,188 (38.66%) and won forty-four states to Senator Goldwater’s six 
(Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina). Nat’l 
Archives & Record Admin., Historical Election Results, available at 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-
college/votes/1965_1969.html#1964 (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).  
 114. Wooten, supra note 28, at 736. 
 115. Id.; S. 1103, 90th Cong. (1967). 
 116. Wooten, supra note 28, at 736; S. 3421, 90th Cong. (1968).  
 117. Wooten, supra note 28, at 736 (quoting Private Welfare and Pension Plan 
Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1045, H.R. 1046, and H.R. 16462 Before the 
General Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong. 
155 (1970)). 
 118. See Wooten, supra note 28, at 739. 
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C. The Enactment of ERISA 
The Studebaker plant closure was a searing example of what 
could happen to employee pensions in a completely unregulated 
environment. That environment produced a number of problems 
including little to no disclosure to employees of what pension rights 
they had and the termination of pension plans due to employer 
bankruptcy or poor economic performance.119 Employers were 
allowed to design plans making benefits conditional gifts forfeitable 
at their whim,120 and some retained the right to cut off pension 
benefits of former workers if the former employer did not approve of 
their actions.121 The “law” of retirement plans often consisted of little 
more than a handshake.122 An employer could terminate a worker on 
the cusp of pension eligibility solely to avoid paying the pension.123 
Adding insult to injury, the employer could do this with legal 
impunity. 
In response to these and other issues such as administrative 
ineptness, corruption, graft, and the lack of uniformity in how states 
regulated pensions, Congress enacted ERISA.124 Congress stated that 
ERISA’s most important purpose was to provide American workers 
with a financially secure retirement.125 
Congress divided ERISA into multiple parts, all of which were 
designed to protect plan participants126 and their beneficiaries.127 One 
                                                 
 119. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 1. 
 120. Reece, supra note 29, at 382. 
 121. See CARRAD, supra note 9, at 1. 
 122. Dean, supra note 9, at 647–48 (citing SNYDER, supra note 27, at 4). 
 123. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 1. 
 124. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1452–53 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 93-1280, at 7 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639) 
(“Congress enacted ERISA to . . . ensure ‘the continued well-being and security of 
millions of employees and their dependents’ who rely upon retirement plans.” Id.); 
H.R. REP. NO. 533 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639–43; Julie Ann 
Barbo, Ablamis v. Roper: Preemption of the NonEmployee Spouse’s Community 
Property Rights in ERISA Pension Plans, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1085, 1086–87 
(1992) (explaining that before ERISA, no federal regulation of pension plans 
existed, state regulation varied widely, and many employees lost their expected 
retirement benefits in this environment). 
 125. S. REP. NO. 93-127 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4849. 
 126. A participant is “any employee or former employee of any employer, or any 
member or former member of an employee organization, who is or may become 
eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan [that] covers 
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part requires plan administrators to regularly make certain disclosures 
and reports to plan participants and their beneficiaries.128 These 
disclosure and reporting requirements are enforced by the 
Department of Labor Employee Benefits Security Administration.129 
A second part limits the amount of time that an employee must wait 
before he is allowed to participate in an employer’s pension plan.130 
A third part sets minimum funding requirements for plans.131 A 
fourth part imposes fiduciary duties on plan administrators, which 
require them to act like prudent investors.132 These fiduciary duties 
“include providing adequate benefits to plan participants, minimizing 
[plan] expenses, and diversifying [plan] investments.”133 Finally, a 
fifth part contains enforcement and administrative rules.134 
The enactment of ERISA included the creation of the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a public, non-profit 
                                                                                                                 
employees of such employer or members of such organization, or whose 
beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) 
(2006). 
 127. A beneficiary is “a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an 
employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder.” 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(8). 
 128. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021–1031; Jaffke, supra note 3, at 261; Reece, supra note 
29, at 382–83. The following can serve as the administrator of the plan: (1) a 
person designated under the plan itself; (2) the plan sponsor; (3) the employer; or 
(4) someone chosen by the Secretary of Labor. § 1002(16); Dean, supra note 9, at 
648. “The administrator must provide an annual report that includes a financial 
statement and [an] opinion” by an independent public accountant that the statement 
conforms to generally accepted auditing standards. § 1023; Dean, supra note 9, at 
648. The annual report must also state the “number of employees in the plan, [the 
name] and address[] of any fiduciary, and an actuarial statement.” § 1023(c)(1); 
Dean, supra note 9, at 648. “The administrator must also provide a plan description 
to all participants and beneficiaries of the plan . . . .” § 1023; Dean, supra note 9, at 
649. Upon written request by a plan participant or beneficiary, the administrator 
must provide “a written statement of what benefits have accrued or will become 
non-forfeitable” under the plan. § 1025; Dean, supra note 9, at 649. 
 129. On May 16, 1997, the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration became 
the Employee Benefits Security Administration. 5 C.F.R. § 2641, app. B (2007); 
Dean, supra note 9, at 649. 
 130. 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 131. 29 U.S.C. § 1082. 
 132. 29 U.S.C. § 1104.  
 133. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1114; Dean, supra note 9, n.56, at 649. 
 134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1147; Jaffke, supra note 3, at 261; Reece, supra note 
29, at 382–83. 
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corporation that guarantees all nonforfeitable benefits under ERISA-
governed defined-benefit plans.135 The PBGC has enforcement 
powers, including the authority to investigate pension plans and to 
sue for violations of ERISA.136 It can also collect payments from 
employers who terminate pension plans with outstanding benefit 
liabilities.137 The establishment of the PBGC is the pension-
termination insurance for which so many toiled long before and after 
the Studebaker plant closure.138 
ERISA covers employee pension-benefit plans139 and employee 
welfare-benefit plans.140 Most workers participate in defined-benefit 
plans,141 defined-contribution plans,142 and cash-balance plans.143 
The specifics of each of these plans will be discussed in Part IV of 
this Article. However, ERISA does not cover all pension or 
                                                 
 135. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1303; Dean, supra note 9, at 648; The PBGC insures the 
defined-benefit pensions of an employer’s workers if the benefit plan is 
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 136. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1302–1303. 
 137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1368. Dean, supra note 9, at 650. 
 138. Wooten, supra note 28, at 736–39. 
 139. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). An employee pension-benefit plan is a plan 
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organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or 
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of 
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the 
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or 
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, 
accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, 
apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, 
scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services . . . . 
Id. 
 141. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34). 
 142. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35). 
 143. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(5)(A)–(G). 
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retirement plans.144 It does not cover military145 or government146 
retirement plans.147 Likewise, plans that are maintained for workers’ 
compensation or unemployment,148 church plans, or Individual 
Retirement Accounts are not covered.149 
Two parts of ERISA specifically relate to QDROs: the spendthrift 
provision150 and the preemption provision.151 
1. ERISA’s Spendthrift Provision 
Employers have an incentive to establish and maintain plans 
covered by ERISA because it allows them to take tax deductions on 
the contributions that they make on behalf of participating 
employees.152 Participating employees have this same incentive 
because the contributions that they make to their plans and the 
earnings on those contributions are tax-deferred.153 
                                                 
 144. Dean, supra note 9, at 652. 
 145. Military plans are governed by the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ 
Protection Act, which is codified as 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006). 
 146. Federal government employees who are not members of the armed services 
are covered by either the Federal Employees Retirement System or the Civil 
Service Retirement System. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8345(j), 8467; 5 C.F.R. §§ 838.101–.1018. 
Railroad employees who are not employed by private railroads are covered by the 
Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, codified as 45 U.S.C. §§ 231–231v. CARRAD, 
supra note 9, at 226–28. 
 147. ERISA exempts government plans from its coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 
1003(b)(1). Government plans include those “established or maintained for its 
employees by the Government of the United States, by the government of any State 
or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of any of the 
foregoing.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (2006). On the other hand, public educational 
institutions, such as state universities, may establish and maintain ERISA-covered 
plans for their employees pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 403(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). These are 
known as 403(b) plans. See infra § III.B. 
 148. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3). 
 149. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2). Church plans can elect to be covered, which some 
may find desirable if their plans lack rules for dividing pensions in divorce 
proceedings. Dean, supra note 9, at 652 (citing GARY A. SHULMAN & DAVID I. 
KELLEY, DIVIDING PENSIONS IN DIVORCE § 21.1 (2d ed. 1999)). Individual 
Retirement Accounts are not governed by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1051(6). 
 150. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). “Each pension plan shall provide that benefits 
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.” Id. 
 151. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Section 1144(a) states in part that ERISA supersedes 
all state laws relating to any employee-benefit plan. Id. 
 152. 26 U.S.C. § 404. 
 153. 26 U.S.C. § 402A(a). 
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For employers to take advantage of the tax benefits afforded 
under ERISA, their retirement plans must expressly prohibit the 
assignment or alienation of benefits provided to employees.154 
Congress included this provision to protect employees from their own 
financial imprudence and to protect them from others who might use 
their retirement plans as a means to retaliate against them—as 
employers frequently did before the enactment of ERISA.155 
Congress intended that the employee’s accrued benefits would 
actually be available at retirement; therefore, “Neither the employer 
nor the employee can assign or alienate the benefits.”156 The Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS)157 will not consider a plan qualified under 
ERISA unless the plan explicitly provides that benefits cannot be 
assigned at law or in equity, alienated, or subject to attachment, 
garnishment, levy, execution, or other legal or equitable process.158 
This spendthrift provision has teeth, as reflected in some significant 
Supreme Court decisions.159 
One such decision is Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National 
Pension Fund.160 In Guidry, a union official “pleaded guilty to 
embezzling funds from his union.”161 “The union obtained a 
judgment against him for $275,000. . . . [and t]he District Court 
                                                 
 154. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). 
 155. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 863–64 (1997) (citing Guidry v. Sheet Metal 
Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990)). Congress included an 
anti-alienation provision in ERISA to protect workers’ retirement income. Id.; Am. 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1979). The purpose of the 
anti-alienation and anti-assignment provision “is to protect an employee from his 
own financial improvidence in dealings with third parties.” Id.; Reece, supra note 
29, at 383, 386–88. 
 156. Reece, supra note 29, at 387. 
 157. Jurisdiction over ERISA is divided between the Department of Labor and 
the IRS; however, the Department of Labor has jurisdiction over QDROs. I.R.C. § 
401(n); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(3), 1201–1242 (2006). The Department of Labor 
originally had “[t]he authority to issue regulations for the funding and vesting of 
ERISA plans,” but in 1978, President Jimmy Carter issued an executive order 
transferring this authority to the IRS. Dean, supra note 9, at 649–50 (citing 
SNYDER, supra note 27, § 1:4). 
 158. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (2006).; Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (2011); 
Reece, supra note 29, at 386. 
 159. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376. 
 160. 493 U.S. 365. 
 161. Id. at 367. 
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imposed a constructive trust on [his] pension benefits.”162 The union 
official appealed, arguing that the constructive trust violated the anti-
alienation and anti-assignment provisions of ERISA.163 The Supreme 
Court agreed with the union official and declined to create a criminal-
conduct exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation clause.164 The Court 
stated that Congress made the “policy choice . . . to safeguard a 
stream of income for pensioners and their dependents,” even if doing 
so meant preventing parties wronged by pensioners from securing 
relief.165 The Court acknowledged that ERISA’s spendthrift provision 
would “hinder the collection of . . . lawful debt[s],” but stated that if 
an exception to that provision was to be created, then Congress, 
rather than the Court, should create it.166 
In Patterson v. Shumate, the Court considered the question of 
whether a bankrupt debtor’s pension worth $250,000 had to be 
included in his bankruptcy estate and thus reachable by his 
creditors.167 The debtor argued that his pension should be excluded 
from the bankruptcy estate based on ERISA’s spendthrift clause and 
11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2),168 a section of the Bankruptcy Code that 
excludes from the bankruptcy estate trusts that have transfer 
restrictions imposed on them under the “applicable non-bankruptcy 
law.”169 The district court disagreed and held that “applicable non-
bankruptcy law” meant state law only, and that under Virginia law, 
the debtor’s pension did not qualify as a spendthrift trust.170 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, and 
held that the phrase “applicable non-bankruptcy law” included 
                                                 
 162. Id. at 367–70 (citing Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 
641 F. Supp. 360, 360–63 (D. Colo. 1986)). The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district-court judgment. Id. at 370–71 (citing Guidry 
v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457, 1460–61 (10th Cir. 
1988)). 
 163. Id. at 367. 
 164. Id. at 376. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 376–77. 
 167. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 755–57 (1992). 
 168. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2006) (stating that “a restriction on the transfer of a 
beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a [bankruptcy proceeding]”). 
 169. Patterson, 504 U.S. at 755–57. 
 170. Id. (citing Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 83 B.R. 404, 406 (W.D. Va. 
1988)). 
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ERISA’s non-alienation provision and that it restricted the transfer of 
the debtor’s pension to the bankruptcy estate.171 The Supreme Court 
affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s decision and noted that it would be 
inconsistent to allow a creditor to reach a debtor’s ERISA-covered 
pension in a bankruptcy proceeding but disallow that same creditor 
access to that pension in a garnishment or collection action outside of 
a bankruptcy case.172 The Court resolved this inconsistency in favor 
of shielding debtors’ ERISA pensions from the reach of creditors, 
even in bankruptcy proceedings.173 
At bottom, ERISA’s spendthrift provision makes an employee’s 
pension benefits off limits to creditors, even those who became 
creditors as a result of wrongs committed by the pensioner.174 
Creditors, however, are not the only parties left in the lurch by 
ERISA’s spendthrift provision. Before the enactment of the REA, 
divorced persons could be treated like creditors and be denied their 
marital share of their former spouses’ retirement plans based on 
ERISA’s spendthrift and preemption provisions.175 
                                                 
 171. Id. at 756–57 (citing Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 365–66 (4th Cir. 
1991)). 
 172. 504 U.S. at 764 (citing Donna Litman Seiden, Chapter 7 Cases: Do ERISA 
and the Bankruptcy Code Conflict as to Whether a Debtor’s Interest in or Rights 
Under a Qualified Plan can be Used to Pay Claims?, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 301, 317 
(1987)). 
 173. Id. at 764–65. 
 174. See supra notes 152–73 and accompanying text. “The anti-alienation 
provision . . . ‘bespeak[s] a pension law protective policy of special intensity: 
Retirement funds shall remain inviolate until retirement.’” Boggs v. Boggs, 520 
U.S. 833, 851 (1997) (quoting LANGBEIN, supra note 113, at 547). Reece, supra 
note 29, at 408. Even though a civil jury found O.J. Simpson liable for the deaths of 
Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman, their estates cannot touch his major 
source of wealth to collect their judgment: two pension and retirement funds valued 
at a minimum of $2.5 million. Id. ERISA’s anti-alienation and anti-assignment 
provisions render these funds off limits to judgment creditors. Id. 
 175. Pub. L. No. 98-387, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 1426) 2547, 
2549, 2564–68. 
2011] QUALIFIED DOMESTIC-RELATIONS ORDERS 443 
2. ERISA Preemption 
Federal legislation can preempt state legislation.176 The basis of 
Congress’s preemption authority is the Supremacy Clause,177 and 
when preemption issues arise, a court must determine whether 
Congress intended to trump the state’s law-making authority.178 
Congress may preempt state law explicitly or implicitly. State laws 
have to yield, regardless of the particular method that Congress 
chooses when Congress seeks to be the exclusive legislative authority 
in a given arena.179 
If an act of Congress does not contain clear preemptive language, 
then preemption may nevertheless be inferred in three instances: first, 
if “‘[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive [that it is 
reasonable to infer] that Congress left no room for the states to 
supplement it”’; second, if the congressional enactment touches “‘a 
field [where] the federal interest is so dominant that the federal 
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the 
same subject’”; and third, if “‘the object sought to be obtained by . . . 
federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it . . . 
reveal[s] the same purpose’” as state law.180 “Even where Congress 
has not completely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state 
law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal 
law.”181 “Such . . . conflict[s] arise[] when ‘compliance with . . . 
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,’ or when 
                                                 
 176. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 
461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 
(1977)). 
 177. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding. 
Id. 
 178. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152–53 (1982). 
 179. Id. at 153 (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)). 
 180. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 181. Id. 
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state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”182  
Given “the centrality of pension . . . plans in the national 
economy, and their importance to the financial security of the 
Nation’s work force,” Congress sought to bring uniformity to the 
regulation of employee-benefit plans.183 Congress accomplished this 
uniformity by structuring ERISA to expressly preempt all state laws 
related to employee-benefit plans.184 If a federal law contains an 
express preemption clause—as ERISA does—then a court still must 
determine whether Congress intended federal law to occupy the 
entire field or if state and federal law are at loggerheads.185 The 
former type of preemption is called field preemption, and it applies 
when Congress assumes exclusive jurisdiction to regulate a 
subject.186 When it does, state regulation is not allowed—even if the 
state regulation is consistent with federal regulation.187 This latter 
type is called conflict preemption, and under it “states possess 
concurrent authority with the federal government to regulate the 
subject area.”188 If state law and federal law conflict, then “the 
Supremacy Clause dictates that the federal law will prevail; 
otherwise, states may enforce their consistent and supplemental laws 
in the federally regulated area.”189 The case of Boggs v. Boggs 
presented the Supreme Court with the question of what type of 
                                                 
 182. 458 U.S. at 153 (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 
(1977); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 
(1963); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 773 
(1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 183. Boggs v. Boggs, 502 U.S. 833, 839 (1997); Jaffke, supra note 3, at 262. 
 184. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 841 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1975)). 
 185. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (citing Freightliner 
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)). 
 186. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229–31 (1947); Jaffke, 
supra note 3, at 263 (citing Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite 
ERISA: Will the Supreme Court Allow States To Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. 
L. REV. 951, 961 (2000)). 
 187. Rice, 331 U.S. at 229–31; Jaffke, supra note 3, at 263 (citing Bogan, supra 
note 186, at 961). 
 188. Rice, 331 U.S. at 229–31; Jaffke, supra note 3, at 263 (citing Bogan, supra 
note 186, at 961–62). 
 189. Rice, 331 U.S. at 229–31; Jaffke, supra note 3, at 263 (citing Bogan, supra 
note 186, at 962). 
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preemption, if any, applies under ERISA with respect to state 
community-property and succession laws.190 
Isaac Boggs retired from South Central Bell in 1985 after thirty-
six years of service.191 When he started at the company, Mr. Boggs 
was married to Dorothy Boggs and remained so until she died in 
1979.192 Their marriage produced three sons.193 Following Dorothy’s 
death, Mr. Boggs married Sandra Boggs and remained married to her 
until he died in 1989.194 Mr. Boggs retired in 1985 and received a 
lump-sum distribution from his South Central Bell retirement plan in 
the amount of $151,628.94, which he rolled over into an individual 
retirement account (IRA).195 When he died, the account contained 
$180,778.05.196 In addition to the lump-sum payment, Mr. Boggs 
received ninety-six shares of stock and a monthly annuity payment of 
$1,777.67.197 
Before she died, Dorothy executed a will that left Mr. Boggs one-
third of her estate and a life estate in the remaining two-thirds.198 She 
left ownership in the remaining two-thirds to her three sons, subject 
to their father’s life estate.199 Under Louisiana law, Dorothy’s will 
controlled the distribution of her community-property200 “interest in 
[Mr. Boggs’s] undistributed pension plan benefits.”201 In 1980, a 
Louisiana state court determined that her interest in those benefits 
had a value of $21,194.29.202 Sandra challenged the validity of 
Dorothy’s testamentary transfer, arguing that Mr. Boggs’s will left 
                                                 
 190. 520 U.S. 833, 835 (1997). 
 191. Id. at 836. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 105 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
annuity as “[a]n obligation to pay a stated sum, usually monthly or annually, to a 
stated recipient”). See generally CARRAD, supra note 9, at 70 (explaining that the 
length of time an annuity is paid can be tied to the lifetime of one person or 
multiple persons).  
 198. 520 U.S. at 836. 
 199. Id. at 836–37. 
 200. Id. at 840; see also 1 W. DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
11, 85–89 (1943) (explaining that Louisiana is a community-property state). 
 201. 520 U.S. at 837. 
 202. Id. 
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his undistributed benefits to her, and that she was entitled to them 
under ERISA.203 Mr. Boggs’s will left Sandra the family home and a 
life estate in the remainder of his estate.204 He also left his sons the 
remainder of his estate, subject to Sandra’s life estate.205 
Following their father’s death, two of Mr. Boggs’s sons filed a 
state-court action seeking a judgment awarding them a portion of the 
IRA, the stock, and the monthly annuity payments that Mr. Boggs 
received during his life.206 They also requested that the court award 
them the survivor-annuity payments that Sandra had already been 
paid as well as future annuity payments that would be paid to her.207 
Sandra filed a complaint in federal district court seeking a declaration 
that ERISA preempted Louisiana law to the extent that it recognized 
the sons’ claim to the survivor’s annuity.208 The sons filed a motion 
for summary judgment, and the court granted it. It found “that, under 
Louisiana community property law, Dorothy had an ownership 
interest in [Mr. Boggs’s] pension plan benefits [that accrued] during 
their marriage.”209 The court further held that Dorothy’s ownership 
interest did not contravene ERISA’s spendthrift provision because 
“Congress did not intend [ERISA] to alter traditional familial or 
support obligations.”210 The court did not consider Dorothy’s 
testamentary transfer to be an assignment or alienation of the pension 
benefits because she acquired her right to those benefits under 
community-property law, not by a transfer from Mr. Boggs.211 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 
agreeing with the district court that Dorothy’s testamentary transfer 
                                                 
 203. Id. Sandra relied on 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a)(1) (2006), the part of ERISA that 
creates a qualified joint-and-survivor annuity, which requires that when a plan 
participant dies after his annuity starts, the accrued benefit owed to him must be 
paid to his surviving spouse as long as the surviving spouse did not execute a 
written waiver of her right to the survivor’s annuity. §§ 1055(c)(2); 1055(d)(1). The 
surviving spouse receives at least one-half of the amount of the annuity that the 
participant received during his life. § 1055(d)(1). 
 204. 520 U.S. at 837. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 837, 838 (citing Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. La. 1994)). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 838 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2006)). 
 211. Id. 
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did not constitute “a prohibited assignment or alienation.”212 The 
Fifth Circuit’s decision conflicted with Ablamis v. Roper, a Ninth 
Circuit case that “held that ERISA pre-empts a testamentary transfer 
by [the spouse of a plan participant] of her community property 
interest in undistributed pension plan benefits.”213 This circuit split 
presented the Supreme Court of the United States with the question 
of whether and how ERISA preempts state community-property and 
succession laws.214 
The Court ruled that ERISA did preempt state community-
property law using a conflict-preemption analysis.215 The Court 
began by analyzing whether Louisiana’s community-property and 
succession laws conflicted with ERISA.216 The Court concluded that 
they did, so it did not reach the question of whether field preemption 
applied.217 The Court determined that the objective of the qualified 
joint-and-survivor annuity provision of ERISA218 would be rendered 
                                                 
 212. Id. (citing Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 213. Id. at 839 (citing Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 841. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. In the same term that the Court decided Boggs, it decided two other 
ERISA-preemption cases. See De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. 
Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997) and California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. 
Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997). Before that, the Court decided 
thirteen ERISA-preemption cases in sixteen years. See New York State Conference 
of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995); John 
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86 (1993); 
District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992); 
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 
498 U.S. 52 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989); Mackey v. 
Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988); Fort Halifax Packing 
Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 
(1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 
(1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981). The frequency 
with which the issue presented itself to the Court prompted Justice John Paul 
Stevens to observe that the issue had also generated an avalanche of litigation in the 
lower courts. See District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 
U.S. 125, 135 n.3 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that in 1992, a LEXIS 
search uncovered more than 2,800 opinions on ERISA preemption). 
 218. 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006). The objective of § 1055 is to provide “a stream of 
income to surviving spouses.” Boggs, 520 U.S. at 843. A qualified joint-and-
survivor annuity is an annuity payable for the joint lives of two spouses that 
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useless if states allowed “a predeceasing spouse’s heirs and legatees 
to have a community property interest in the survivor’s annuity.”219 
Additionally, the Court found that “[t]estamentary transfers could 
reduce a surviving spouse’s guaranteed annuity below the minimum 
set by ERISA,” which is 50% of the annuity that the plan participant 
would have received for the duration of his and his wife’s life.220 The 
Court deemed this conflict to be a “direct clash between state law and 
. . . ERISA.” Hence, state law could not stand.221 Allowing Dorothy’s 
testamentary transfer would thwart the intent of ERISA’s survivor’s 
annuity and take away Sandra’s right to the annuity that she was 
entitled to receive as Mr. Boggs’s surviving spouse.222 This is not 
something that ERISA allows states to do through their community-
property or testamentary laws.223 
Dorothy’s testamentary transfer also violated ERISA’s 
prohibition on the assignment or alienation of plan benefits intended 
for plan participants and their beneficiaries.224 Under ERISA, 
beneficiaries of a plan participant are a surviving spouse, a living 
former spouse, a child, or another dependent—as long as one or more 
of these persons are designated as a beneficiary in the QDRO.225 
Dorothy’s will did not constitute a QDRO, and so her sons could not 
be considered beneficiaries.226 Dorothy’s interest in Mr. Boggs’s 
undistributed plan benefits terminated when she died.227 On the other 
hand, Sandra’s interest in those same benefits existed by virtue of 
ERISA’s qualified-joint-survivor-annuity provision.228 This meant 
that Mr. Boggs’s sons were not entitled to any of his retirement 
benefits upon his death because they were not participants in the 
                                                                                                                 
terminates when the survivor dies. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d)(1). An alternate payee who 
is a former spouse has to have been “married to the participant throughout the one-
year period ending on the earlier of the participant’s death or annuity starting date.” 
§ 1055(f)(1). 
 219. 520 U.S. at 843. 
 220. Id. at 844. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 851. 
 225. Id. at 847 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(K) (2006)). 
 226. Id. at 848. 
 227. See id. at 843–44. 
 228. See id. at 841–44. 
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retirement plan nor were they beneficiaries as defined by the 
statute.229 
In deciding this case in Sandra’s favor, the Court addressed the 
contention that when state domestic-relations law collides with 
federal law, preemption should not be presumed simply because 
domestic-relations law has historically been the domain of the 
states.230 The Court held that community-property laws that 
conflicted with ERISA had to be preempted in order to ensure the 
implementation of the federal statutory scheme, particularly the goal 
of ensuring that retirement funds remained untouched until 
retirement.231 
The combination of ERISA’s preemptive sweep and its 
spendthrift provision created a dilemma for state domestic-relations 
courts.232 Because pension benefits could not be assigned or 
alienated,233 and because ERISA preempted all state laws relating to 
employee-benefit plans,234 some courts held that a party’s retirement 
benefits could not be touched, even if that party owed family-support 
obligations such as alimony, separate maintenance, or child 
support.235 Those courts also held that pension benefits could not be 
                                                 
 229. See id. at 851–54. 
 230. Id. at 840, 851–53 (citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581–90 
(1979)). “‘The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent 
and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United 
States.’” Id. at 848 (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890)). 
 231. Id. at 851–54. “‘The anti-alienation provision . . . bespeak[s] a pension law 
protective policy of special intensity: Retirement funds shall remain inviolate until 
retirement.’” Id. at 851 (quoting LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 113, at 547). This 
did not mark the first time that the Court preempted state community-property 
laws. See, e.g., Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 
U.S. 46 (1981); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981); Hisquierdo v. 
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. 
Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905). 
 232. S. REP. NO. 98-575, at 8–20 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 
2564–66. 
 233. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2006). 
 234. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
 235. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Ford, 534 F. Supp. 51, 54 (E.D. Mo. 1981) 
(holding that divorce-related garnishments or attachments for family-support 
obligations would violate ERISA’s spendthrift clause); Francis v. United Techs. 
Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (stating that Congress intended ERISA 
to prevent the voluntary or involuntary assignment or alienation of benefits, with no 
exception for divorce proceedings); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 
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divided in connection with a divorce, even if part of those benefits 
plainly constituted marital or community property under state 
domestic-relations law.236 Other courts reached the opposite 
conclusion, and held that ERISA did not preempt state domestic-
relations law that allowed the attachment of pension benefits to 
satisfy family-support obligations. They also held that state courts 
could still use community-property law to award a divorced spouse 
her marital share of her ex-spouse’s retirement benefits.237 Adding to 
                                                                                                                 
466, 470 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (holding that ERISA forbids the garnishment of a plan 
participant’s retirement benefits to satisfy a judgment obtained in a divorce); 
Kerbow v. Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. 1253, 1260 (N.D. Tex. 1976) “Congress intended 
[ERISA] to supersede any and all state laws regulating employee benefit plans.” Id. 
 236. See cases cited supra note 235. 
 237. See, e.g., Sav. & Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Emps. v. Gago, 717 F.2d 
1038, 1041–45 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that ERISA preemption is inapplicable in 
divorce proceedings), superseded by statute, Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426; Operating Eng’rs Local No. 428 Pension Trust Fund 
v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 196, 198–202 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that an implied 
exception exists to ERISA’s anti-alienation provision that allows a garnishment by 
an ex-spouse for the purpose of satisfying a court-ordered spousal-maintenance 
obligation), superseded by statute, Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
397, 98 Stat. 1426; Carpenters Pension Trust for S. Cal. v. Kronschnabel, 632 F.2d 
745, 748 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the 
previous case for want of a substantial federal question constituted a decision on 
the merits that ERISA did not prevent application of California property law); 
Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that ERISA does not 
preempt a court order requiring a pension plan to pay community-property share of 
benefits to former spouse); Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314, 315–17 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(holding that ERISA does not prohibit garnishments in aid of state-court orders 
requiring family-support payments); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 
124 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that state garnishment of a spouse’s pension income to 
enforce alimony and support orders is not preempted); Eichelberger v. 
Eichelberger, 584 F. Supp. 899, 900–01 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (holding that ERISA does 
not preempt Texas community-property law), superseded by statute, Retirement 
Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426; Cent. States v. Parr, 480 F. 
Supp. 924, 925 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (holding that pension benefits can be garnished 
to satisfy temporary alimony obligations); Senco of Florida, Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. 
Supp. 902, 908 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (holding that garnishment of an employee’s 
pension benefits for child support or alimony is not prohibited under federal law); 
Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that ERISA 
does not preempt valid spousal or support claims); In re Marriage of Campa, 152 
Cal. Rptr. 362, 367–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that it does not violate ERISA 
to make a pension plan a party to a marriage-dissolution proceeding and order it to 
send one-half of a monthly benefit check to the participant and one-half to the 
participant’s former spouse), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
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the confusion, the IRS ruled that ERISA’s spendthrift clause did not 
prohibit a pension-plan administrator from honoring a state-court 
order requiring the distribution of a plan participant’s benefits if the 
participant started receiving benefits and if the court ordered the 
distribution to fulfill the participant’s alimony or child-support 
obligations.238 The IRS did not express an opinion on situations in 
which the participant had not started receiving benefits.239 
For women who did not have their own pensions, this judicial 
uncertainty caused a particular hardship.240 When Congress passed 
ERISA in 1974, it did not clearly state whether a spouse would have 
an interest in her spouse’s pension benefits in the event of the death 
of, or a divorce from, that spouse.241 Because of this ambiguity, a 
wife could be deprived of her marital- or community-property share 
of her husband’s pension benefits if he died or if the couple 
divorced.242 
Before ERISA, pensions were viewed as contracts between 
employers and employees and were primarily subject to regulation 
under state law.243 “ERISA federalized pension law [and established 
national] rules governing the creation, administration, and 
                                                                                                                 
question sub nom. Carpenters Pension Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. Campa, 444 U.S. 
1028 (1980), superseded by statute, Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-397, 98 Stat. 1426; W. Electric Co. v. Traphagen, 400 A.2d 66, 71 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1979); Biles v. Biles, 394 A.2d 153, 157 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1978); Cogollos v. Cogollos, 402 N.Y.S.2d 929, 929–30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); 
Wanamaker v. Wanamaker, 401 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978). 
 238. Rev. Rul. 80-27, 1980-1 C.B. 85. 
 239. S. REP. NO. 98-575, at 19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 
2565. 
 240. See Jaffke, supra note 3, at 264. See generally S. REP. NO. 98-575, at 1, 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2547.  
 241. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 
1001(a) (2006)). 
 242. Id. (citing Pension Equity for Women: Hearings on H.R. 2100 Before the 
Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 98th Cong. 
26 (1983) (statement of Hon. Geraldine Ferraro)). 
 243. See In re Schenectady Ry. Co., 93 F. Supp. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 1950) (stating 
that pensions are part of the terms of the contract); Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. 
Co., 171 N.E.2d 518, 521 (Ohio 1960) (stating that pension arrangements give rise 
to contractual rights enforceable by the employee); Zimmerman v. Brennan, 202 
N.W.2d 923, 926 (Wis. 1973) (stating that retirement plans are treated like a 
contract); T.P. Gallanis, ERISA and the Law of Succession, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 
185–86 (2004). 
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termination of most pension plans.”244 In short, ERISA was a 
congressional tour de force. Not quite a decade after it became 
effective, however, Congress had to act again to address ERISA’s 
unintended consequences—namely, undercutting the marital and 
succession rights of widows and widowers to their spouses’ pension 
benefits.245 
II. THE REA, THE SURVIVOR ANNUITY, AND THE BIRTH OF THE QDRO 
A. The Survivor Annuity 
President Ronald Reagan signed the REA into law on August 23, 
1984.246 Congress passed the REA primarily to safeguard the 
financial security of widows, widowers, and divorcees.247 The REA 
“afforded protection to widows (and widowers) by requiring pension 
plans to provide automatic survivor benefits.”248 Once a plan 
participant earns a nonforfeitable right to any part of his or her 
accrued pension benefits, the participant's spouse will receive a 
survivor’s annuity if the participant predeceases the spouse.249 In 
such cases, the plan administrator must pay the surviving spouse 
between 50% and 100% of the participant’s benefits.250 This is called 
a qualified joint-and-survivor annuity.251 If the plan participant dies 
                                                 
 244. Gallanis, supra note 243, at 186. 
 245. See Retirement Equity Act 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(98 Stat. 1426) 2547, 2564–66. 
 246. Statement on Signing H.R. 4280 into Law, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
1161 (Sept. 3, 1984). 
 247. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1453 (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency 
& Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 838 (1988) (stating that the primary focus of the QDRO 
exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation clause is to allow spouses to enforce 
domestic-support orders); Heisler v. Jeep Corp.–UAW Ret. Income Plan, 807 F.2d 
505, 509 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that the REA sought to rectify certain inequities 
by providing automatic survivor benefits to spouses of vested plan participants); 
Gabrielson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 785 F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating 
that Congress amended 29 U.S.C. § 1055 to enlarge the rights of surviving spouses 
to receive benefits). 
 248. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1453 (citing Pension Equity for Women: Hearings on 
H.R. 2100 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations of the Comm. on Edu. 
& Labor, 98th Cong. 26-27 (1983)) Although Congress primarily concerned itself 
with widows, the REA’s survivorship clauses also benefits widowers also. Id. 
 249. Id. at 1453 n.6 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d)(1) (2006)). 
 250. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d)(1)(A). 
 251. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d)(1). 
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before he or she starts receiving pension benefits, then the surviving 
spouse may still receive benefits in the form of a qualified pre-
retirement survivor annuity.252 In such cases, the annuity must be at 
least equal to the payments that would have been made under a 
qualified joint-and-survivor annuity.253 
The survivor annuity is mandatory and cannot be waived unless a 
writing is executed by the plan participant and his spouse and the 
writing is either notarized or the signing is witnessed by a plan 
representative.254 Once the surviving spouse dies, the annuity 
terminates.255 The surviving spouse cannot bequeath the annuity 
benefits.256 
B. The Birth of the QDRO 
Prior to the REA, federal and state courts were split on the 
question of whether state-court orders issued in domestic-relations 
proceedings could affect the distribution of pension benefits governed 
by ERISA. Some courts held that ERISA barred such distributions, 
and others held that it did not.257 Responding to this uncertainty and 
“‘taking into account changes in work patterns, the status of marriage 
as an economic partnership, and the substantial contribution to that 
partnership [made by] spouses who work . . . in the home and outside 
the home,’” the REA created an exception to ERISA’s spendthrift 
provision.258 The exception specifically allows state-court-ordered 
assignments of plan benefits to former spouses and dependents.259 
This exception to ERISA’s spendthrift clause is called a QDRO.260 
                                                 
 252. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e). An alternate payee who is a former spouse must have 
been married to the participant throughout the one-year period ending on the earlier 
of the participant’s death or annuity starting date. § 1055(f)(1). 
 253. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e)(1)(A). 
 254. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2). 
 255. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 256. Id.; see also Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841–45 (1997). 
 257. Trs. of the Dirs. Guild of Am.–Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 
F.3d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 2000); see supra notes 236–38. 
 258. Tise, 234 F.3d at 419 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-575, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 1426) 2547, 2547; Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co., 
207 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1452–53). 
 259. Id. 
 260. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (2006). 
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A QDRO is a particular type of domestic-relations order, which is 
an order “made pursuant to State domestic relations law [or] 
community property law [relating to] the provision of child support, 
alimony, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, 
or other dependent of a [pension-plan] participant.”261 A QDRO is a 
domestic-relations order that “creates or recognizes the existence of 
an alternate payee’s right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right 
to, receive all or [part] of the benefits payable” to a participant in an 
ERISA pension plan.262 The order cannot “require a plan to provide 
any type or form of benefit or . . . option not otherwise provided 
under the plan;” it cannot require the plan “to provide increased 
benefits;” and it cannot require the plan to pay benefits to an alternate 
payee if those benefits are supposed to be paid to another alternative 
payee under the terms of previously entered QDRO.263 Finally, the 
order must clearly specify the following: (1) the name and address of 
the participant; (2) the name and address of the alternate payee; (3) 
the amount or percentage of the participant’s benefits to be paid by 
the plan to the alternate payee or how the amount or percentage will 
be calculated; (4) the number of payments or payment periods; and 
(5) each plan covered by the order.264 
The QDRO is not only an exception to ERISA’s spendthrift 
clause; it is also an exception to ERISA’s preemption of state 
domestic-relations law.265 However, this does not mean that all 
domestic-relations orders are exempt from these two provisions; only 
domestic-relations orders that are QDROs as defined by the REA are 
exempted from ERISA’s spendthrift and preemption clauses.266 State 
domestic-relations orders can create enforceable interests in a 
person’s benefits under an ERISA-qualified plan, provided that those 
                                                 
 261. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii). 
 262. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I). An “‘alternate payee’ is a spouse, former 
spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant who is recognized by a domestic-
relations order as having a right to receive all, or a portion of, the benefits payable 
under a plan with respect to such participant.” 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(K). 
 263. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(i)–(iii). 
 264. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(i)–(iv). 
 265. Trs. of the Dirs. Guild of Am.–Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 
F.3d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7)). 
 266. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A). 
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orders comply with the REA’s QDRO requirements.267 All other 
domestic-relations orders are expressly subject to the spendthrift and 
preemption clauses.268 
The primary responsibility for determining whether a domestic-
relations order is a QDRO rests with the ERISA plan to which it is 
directed.269 Plans typically have a person designated as the plan 
administrator who undertakes this responsibility.270 Plan 
administrators need not be, and in most cases are not, lawyers.271 
Once a plan administrator receives a domestic-relations order to 
determine if it is a QDRO, ERISA does not allow him to “look 
beneath the surface” of that order or to second guess state judges’ 
decisions under state law.272 
After obtaining a domestic-relations order in a state-court 
proceeding, an alternate payee must present the order to the plan 
administrator so that the administrator can determine if it is a 
QDRO.273 Once the administrator receives the order, he must 
“promptly notify the participant and each alternate payee of the 
receipt of [the] order and the plan’s procedures for determining the 
qualified status” of the order.274 Additionally, within a reasonable 
time, the plan administrator must determine whether it is a QDRO 
                                                 
 267. S. REP. NO. 98-575, at 19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 
2565 “[ERISA’s] spendthrift rules should be clarified by creating a limited 
exception that permits benefits under a pension . . . plan to be divided under certain 
circumstances. . . . [C]hanges to the ERISA preemption provision are necessary to 
ensure that only those orders that are excepted from the spendthrift provisions are 
not preempted by ERISA”. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G)(i). When the plan administrator receives a 
domestic-relations order, he must do the following: 
(I) [P]romptly notify the participant and each alternate payee of the 
receipt of such order and the plan’s procedures for determining the 
qualified status of domestic relations orders, and  
(II) within a reasonable period after receiving such order, [he] shall 
determine whether such order is a qualified domestic relations order 
and notify the participant and each alternate payee of such 
determination. 
Id. 
 270. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A). 
 271. Blue v. UAL Corp., 160 F.3d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 272. Id. at 385–86. 
 273. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G)(i)(II). 
 274. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G)(i)(I). 
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and notify the participant and each alternate payee of that 
determination.275 Thus, “whether an alternate payee has an interest in 
a participant’s pension plan is a matter decided [in] a state court 
proceeding [under that] state’s domestic relations law.”276 “Whether 
[that] state court order meets the statutory requirements to be a 
QDRO and . . . is enforceable against the pension plan, [however,] is 
a matter to be determined in the first instance by the plan 
administrator, and if necessary, by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.”277 
While the plan administrator is determining whether a domestic-
relations order is a QDRO, he must “segregate the benefits that would 
be due to the alternate payee under the terms of the [order] during the 
first 18 months that those benefits would be payable if the [order] is 
ultimately deemed a QDRO.”278 If the order is determined to be a 
QDRO within the benefit-segregation period, then the plan 
administrator must pay the segregated benefits, including interest, to 
the alternate payee.279 If, however, during the benefit-segregation 
period the order is determined not to be a QDRO, then the plan 
administrator must pay the segregated benefits, including interest, to 
the person who would otherwise have been entitled to the benefits if 
there were no QDRO.280 If the plan administrator thereafter 
determines that a domestic-relations order is a QDRO, then the plan 
must start paying benefits to the alternate payee. The plan, however, 
cannot make payments retroactively.281 
Underlying this benefits-segregation period is the assumption that 
benefits might be payable during the period that the plan 
administrator is determining if the domestic-relations order is a 
QDRO.282 Congress knew that further litigation in state court might 
take place during the QDRO-determination period, which would 
provide an alternate payee the opportunity to make the changes 
necessary to get the original domestic-relations order qualified as a 
                                                 
 275. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G)(i)(II). 
 276. Trs. of the Dirs. Guild of Am.–Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 
F.3d 415, 421 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 277. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(i)). 
 278. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(v)). 
 279. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(ii). 
 280. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(iii). 
 281. Tise, 234 F.3d at 422 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (d)(3)(H)(iv)). 
 282. Id. 
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QDRO.283 Congress did not intend, however, that plan administrators 
take eighteen months to determine if a domestic-relations order 
qualifies as a QDRO.284 The point of the eighteen-month period is to 
allow enough time to cure any defects in the order that a person seeks 
to have qualified as a QDRO.285 This is reflected in the language of 
the statute,286 that says that an alternate payee may present the plan 
administrator with modifications to the original domestic-relations 
order within the eighteen-month benefit-segregation period.287 If the 
plan administrator determines before the end of the segregation 
period that a modified order is a QDRO, then the alternate payee’s 
entitlement to the benefits is fully protected.288 
This process seems straight-forward enough: (1) draft a domestic-
relations order that includes what the REA says it must include to be 
qualified as a QDRO; (2) present the order to the plan administrator; 
and (3) wait to hear whether the order qualifies as a QDRO. If it does 
not qualify, then the attorney must do the following: make whatever 
changes are necessary to satisfy the plan administrator, submit the 
order anew to have it qualified as a QDRO, and take satisfaction in 
knowing that the attorney served his or her client well by securing the 
client's interest in his or her ex-spouse’s pension benefits. As with so 
many things, however, there is quite a bit of distance between theory 
and reality. The journey from domestic-relations order to QDRO can 
be treacherous. This Article will now turn to helping those involved 
in this journey avoid the most common traps for the unwary. 
                                                 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. “[W]ithin a reasonable period after receipt of [the] order, the plan 
administrator [must] determine whether [the] order is a qualified domestic relations 
order . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G)(i)(II). The Department of Labor’s position 
is that the eighteen-month benefit-segregation period “is not the measure of the 
reasonable period for determining the qualified status of an order and in most cases 
would be an unreasonably long period of time to take to review an order.” QDROs: 
The Division of Retirement Benefits Through Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, 
supra note 9. 
 285. QDROs: The Division of Retirement Benefits Through Qualified Domestic 
Relations Orders, supra note 9. 
 286. Tise, 234 F.3d at 422. 
 287. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(ii)). 
 288. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(ii)). 
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III. PLANS COVERED BY ERISA 
Before preparing a domestic-relations order for qualification as a 
QDRO, the drafter must have some understanding of the type of plan 
that he attempting to divide. ERISA governs most, but not all, 
pension plans in the United States.289 Most of these plans are defined-
benefit plans,290 defined-contribution plans,291 or cash-balance 
pension plans.292 
A. Defined-Benefit Plans 
In a defined-benefit pension plan, the employer promises to 
provide the employee a fixed benefit upon retirement—usually 
related to the employee’s service, pay, or some combination of the 
two.293 “Retirement benefits depend on a calculation of average 
earnings either under a final-average or career-average formula . . . 
.”294 The final-average formula bases the level of benefits on 
“earnings averaged, for example, over the last three years of 
employment or over the three consecutive years in a ten year period 
immediately prior to retirement in which earnings are the highest.”295 
                                                 
 289. Dean, supra note 9, at 652–55; see supra notes 138–43. 
 290. A defined-benefit plan means “a pension plan other than an individual 
account plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35). 
 291. A defined-contribution plan means “a pension plan [that] provides for an 
individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the 
amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains 
and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be 
allocated to such participant’s account.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34). 
 292. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(5)(A)–(G). “In 2006, Congress enacted the Pension 
Protection Act (‘PPA’), which amended the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (‘ERISA’) to specifically allow for cash balance defined benefit 
plans.” Hirt v. Equitable Ret. Plan for Emps., Managers & Agents, 533 F.3d 102, 
104 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 
701(a)(1), 120 Stat. 780, 981 (codified as amended at § 1054(b)(5)(A)–(G))). “The 
amendment, however, applies only to periods beginning on or after June 29, 2005.” 
Id. (citing Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 701(e)(1), 120 
Stat. 780, 991); see also T. Leigh Anenson & Karen Eilers Lahey, The Crisis in 
Corporate America: Private Pension Liability and Proposals for Reform, 9 U. PA. 
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 495, 502 (2007). 
 293. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 292, at 500. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. (citing EVERETT T. ALLEN, JR., ET. AL., PENSION PLANNING: PENSION, 
PROFIT-SHARING, AND OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS 229–34 (Michele 
Janicek ed., 9th ed. 2003)). 
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The career-average formula “bases benefits on earnings averaged 
over the entire career of employment.”296 The employee is paid for 
the remainder of his or her life, and subsidized early retirement 
benefits are usually included in the plan.297 
The employee may or may not contribute to the plan, but any 
contributions are usually fixed.298 The employer’s contributions, 
however, are not fixed. If the plan’s investments perform below 
expectations, then the employer will have to pay more into the fund 
in order to fulfill its obligation to pay the retirement benefits that are 
promised in the plan.299 On the other hand, if the plan’s investments 
perform better than expected, then the employer may not have to 
contribute as much and instead may rely on the fund’s investment 
earnings to pay promised benefits.300 “The employer bears the risk 
that the employee or [his] spouse will live long enough to [receive] 
all the benefits paid into the pension plan” because if there are 
insufficient funds in the plan to pay for those benefits, then the 
employer has to make up the difference.301 “[T]he employer’s cost[s 
also] include[] the amount necessary to provide the benefit as well as 
administrative and actuarial expenses.”302 
“[D]efined benefit pensions are insured against default by the 
PBGC, [and employers] pay insurance premiums per employee for 
each employee participating in the pension [plan].”303 Employers 
“also pay variable rate premiums should their funding ratios fall 
below [a] statutory average.”304 These plans can be very expensive 
for employers because the formula for determining the promised 
benefits can become backloaded due to the high salaries of long-time 
employees during the last three to five years of employment.305 
                                                 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Montgomery v. United States, 18 F.3d 500, 501 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 501–02. 
 301. Dean, supra note 9, at 654 (citing Kathleen H. Czarney, Note, The Future of 
Americans’ Pensions: Revamping Pension Plan Asset Allocation To Combat the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s Deficit, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 153, 166 
(2004)). 
 302. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 292, at 500. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 500–01; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(1) (2006). 
 305. Angela Boothe Noel, The Future of Cash Balance Plans: Inherently Illegal 
or a Viable Pension Option?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 899, 899–900 (2005). 
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Defined-benefit plans used to be the predominant type of pension 
plan in the United States, but now fewer than 20% of private-sector 
employees are covered by defined-benefit plans.306 
B. Defined-Contribution Plans 
Defined-contribution plans provide participants with individual 
accounts that are funded by contributions from the participants, 
employers, or both.307 When the participant retires, he or she may 
liquidate the account or draw periodic payments from it.308 
Contributions to the account are invested, which results in a balance 
that consists of the contributions, plus investment gains, minus 
expenses and investment losses.309 The “benefit is not ‘defined[]’ 
[because] it depends on the investment performance of the retirement 
fund.”310 Employees assume the investment risk and the risk that they 
may outlive the amount in their accounts at retirement.311 Two 
popular defined-contribution plans are 401(k)312 and 403(b)313 plans. 
The defined-contribution plan is the most popular private-sector 
retirement plan because employers prefer that the risk of funding 
retirement be borne by employees.314 These plans are not insured by 
the PBGC.315 
                                                 
 306. Dean, supra note 9, at 653 (citing Matthew Venhorst, Note, Helping 
Individual Investors Do What They Know Is Right: The Save More for Retirement 
Act of 2005, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 113, 115 (2006–2007)) (stating that 62% of all 
workers had defined-benefit plans in the 1970s; that number dropped to 13% by 
1997). 
 307. 26 U.S.C. § 414(i). 
 308. Dean, supra note 9, at 654 (citing Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined 
Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 463–64 (2004) (stating that defined-
contribution plans normally pay participants in a lump sum upon their retirement, 
and then it is up to them to invest the funds or purchase an annuity contract)). 
 309. 26 U.S.C. § 414(i). 
 310. Montgomery v. United States, 18 F.3d 500, 501 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 311. See Anenson & Lahey, supra note 292, at 501. 
 312. 26 U.S.C. § 401(k). 
 313. 26 U.S.C. § 403(b). Section 403(b) plans are essentially 401(k) plans for 
persons who work for tax-exempt organizations or public schools. See id. 
 314. Dean, supra note 9, at 654–55. 
 315. General FAQs About PBGC, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTEE CORPORATION, 
http://www.pbgc.gov/about/faq/pg/general-faqs-about-pbgc.html (last visited Jan. 
12, 2012). 
2011] QUALIFIED DOMESTIC-RELATIONS ORDERS 461 
“[In] 2002, employees and their employers contributed over $84 
billion to defined contribution pension plans . . . bringing the amount 
held in such plans on behalf of many of America’s [workers] to 
nearly $2 trillion . . . .”316 This amount exceeded the assets of 
defined-benefit pension plans by over $200 million.317 Over one-half 
of “private pension plan assets are held in [defined-contribution] 
plans.”318 By way of comparison, in 2002, contributions to defined-
contribution plans and defined-benefit plans were approximately $80 
billion and $39 billion, respectively.319 
C. Cash-Balance Pension Plans 
The cash-balance plan is a defined-benefit plan with many 
features of a defined-contribution plan.320 The employee has an 
account that consists of “[his] contributions at a specified rate of 
interest.”321 It is a defined-benefit plan:  
[B]ecause the employer bears the investment risk and 
guarantees a particular benefit at retirement. If the 
account earns more interest on the funds [than is 
necessary to pay benefits] the employer keeps the 
excess. If the account earns less interest, [then] the 
employee is still assured an amount at the specified 
interest rate. Cash balance plans provide [fairly] 
uniform increases in benefits during [a worker’s] 
employment and do not have the [substantial increase] 
in benefits embodied in the final average formulas 
of . . . traditional defined benefit plans. Rather than 
offering deferred annuity payments based on a salary 
                                                 
 316. Paul J. Donahue, Plan Sponsor Fiduciary Duty for the Selection of Options 
in Participant-Directed Defined Contribution Plans and the Choice Between Stable 
Value and Money Market, 39 AKRON L. REV. 9, 9 (2006). 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 11. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 292, at 502 (citing Edward A. Zelinsky, The 
Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683, 715–16 (2000)). 
 321. Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(c)(3)(i) (as amended in 2001); I.R.S. 
Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359. 
462 THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:3 
and service formula, cash balance plans typically 
distribute retirement benefits in one lump sum.322  
The plans are insured by the PBGC.323 Cash-balance plans have 
become quite popular, particularly among employers with cash-
strapped defined-benefit plans, and thousands of employers have 
converted their defined-benefit plans into cash-balance plans.324 Once 
                                                 
 322. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 292, at 502 (citing Zelinsky, supra note 320, 
at 693–94) (citing EVERETT T. ALLEN, JR., ET. AL., PENSION PLANNING: PENSION, 
PROFIT-SHARING, AND OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION 345–46 (9th ed. 2003); 
PATRICK J. PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30496, PENSION ISSUES: LUMP-
SUM DISTRIBUTIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY 6 (2003)). 
 323. General FAQs About PBGC, supra note 316. 
 324. Fike, supra note 9, at 236–37. This conversion process has proved quite 
controversial. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 17–18; Reiss, supra note 27, at 8. Under a 
traditional defined-benefit plan, a participant’s benefits are typically based on his 
final average earnings when his pay is usually at an apex. SHULMAN, supra note 16, 
§ 14.01. For example, a plan may base a participant’s pension on the average salary 
she earns between the ages of sixty and sixty-five. Id. If the employee retires with 
forty years of service at age sixty-five, then her final average salary will be 
multiplied by a factor incorporating all forty years of her service. Id. Thus, as the 
employee continues to work year after year, her pension benefits will increase 
substantially because the previous years of employment will push up her final 
average salary. Id. Under a cash-balance plan, however, the participant receives an 
annual pension credit for each year’s salary, i.e., the contribution to the employee’s 
cash-balance account will be based on a percentage of her salary earned in that 
particular year. Id. These credits must be valued based on an annuity for the 
employee beginning at age sixty-five. Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 274 F. 
Supp. 2d 1010, 1021 (S.D. Ill. 2003); 28 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A), (24) (2006). For an 
age-sixty-five annuity, the credits will always be more valuable for a younger 
worker than an older one. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1021. “[E]ach year, as a cash 
balance participant ages, the same contribution made for [her] in the previous year 
declines in value in annuity terms.” Id. (citing Zelinsky, supra note 320, at 733 
(2000)). Additionally, cash-balance plans “measure accrued benefits in terms of 
annuities, not in terms of [annual] contributions.” Id. 
  The rate of a participant’s benefit accrual decreases as she approaches age 
sixty-five. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1022. For example, a forty-nine-year-old 
worker with twenty years of service accrues an age-sixty-five annuity of $8,093 in 
the year 2000. Id. at 1021. The next year, she accrues an additional $622, and by 
2010, his additional accrual is $282. Id. This forty-nine-year-old’s benefit accrual is 
reduced each year. Id. at 1021–22. Had this employee been a participant in a 
defined-benefit plan, her pension calculation would not be based on a single year’s 
earnings, but on her average annual earnings during the last years of employment 
when her earnings are much higher. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 17; SHULMAN, supra 
note 16, § 14.01. This disadvantages older workers because benefits accrued under 
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the domestic-relations practitioner learns what type of plan that he 
has to divide for his client, the drafting process begins. 
IV. COMMON QDRO ERRORS 
A. Lack of an Awareness that QDROs Exist or Are Required 
QDROs came into existence on August 23, 1984, when President 
Ronald Reagan signed the REA.325 Initially, the most common error 
in the preparation of QDROs was the lack of awareness that QDROs 
even existed.326 The law of marriage and divorce in this country dates 
                                                                                                                 
a cash-balance plan will be substantially less than those accumulated under a 
defined-benefit plan. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 17; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 
14.01. 
  In 1999, a group of IBM employees filed a class-action lawsuit in federal 
district court arguing that IBM’s conversion of its defined-benefit pension plan to a 
cash-balance plan violated ERISA’s prohibition on age discrimination. Cooper, 274 
F. Supp. 2d at 1010–14. The court agreed and ruled that IBM’s conversion violated 
ERISA. Id. at 1010. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
reversed, holding that IBM’s cash-balance plan did not unlawfully discriminate on 
the basis of age. Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636, 637–43 (7th Cir. 
2006). The court agreed with the employees’ basic premise that the funding of 
IBM’s cash-balance plan advantaged younger workers while disadvantaging older 
ones but found the argument insufficient to establish age discrimination because it 
is inapposite to compare the time value of money with age discrimination. Id. at 
642. The court stated that it is essential to separate age discrimination from 
characteristics that may be correlated with age (wages rise with seniority and with 
age, but distinctions based on wage levels do not discriminate based on age). Id. A 
plaintiff alleging age discrimination must demonstrate an adverse action because of 
age, and the court found IBM’s plan to be age-neutral. Id. 
  The Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits followed Cooper in cases 
where employees alleged that cash-balance plans violate ERISA’s ban on age 
discrimination. Hurlic v. S. California Gas Co., 539 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 
2008); Hirt v. Equitable Ret. Plan for Emps., Managers, & Agents, 533 F.3d 102 
(2d Cir. 2008); Drutis v. Rand McNally & Co., 499 F.3d 608, 609 (6th Cir. 2007); 
Register v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 477 F.3d 56, 67–74 (3d Cir. 2007). The 
Fifth Circuit suggested in dicta that it would have joined the Second, Third, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits had the employee not abandoned the argument on 
appeal. Rosenblatt v. United Way of Greater Hous., 607 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 
2010). The Eighth Circuit had the issue before it but did not decide the question 
because the employees waived the argument on appeal. Sunder v. U.S. Bancorp 
Pension Plan, 586 F.3d 593, 603 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 325. 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1161 (Sept. 3, 1984); 29 U.S.C. § 
1056(d)(3) (2006). 
 326. Simmons & Watson, supra note 27, at 3–4. 
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back to the establishment of the American colonies;327 by 
comparison, QDROs are of a fairly recent vintage. Thus, it is 
arguably understandable that fewer than three years after Congress 
created QDROs, some practitioners might not have been aware of 
their necessity or importance.328 Today, however, no one can 
reasonably make that claim. 
It is not enough to add language to a separation agreement, 
divorce decree, or property-settlement agreement that states that one 
spouse is to receive all or some portion of the other spouse’s 
retirement benefits. If that is all that the lawyer does to secure a 
client’s marital- or community-property share of her spouse’s 
retirement benefits, then the lawyer has invited side litigation on the 
issue of whether the separation agreement, divorce decree, or 
property-settlement agreement substantially complies with the REA’s 
QDRO requirements.329 While courts have liberally construed the 
                                                 
 327. Roberto Bell, The History of Divorce in the US, ARTICLE DASHBOARD 
(Mar. 3, 2012, 7:22 PM), http://www.articledashboard.com/Article/The-History-
Of-Divorce-In-The-US/971637. 
 328. In re Williams, 50 F. Supp. 2d 951, 958 n.11 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that 
by 1987, the REA and QDROs were firmly established law). 
 329. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080, 1081–85 (7th Cir. 
1994). The Seventh Circuit held that a divorce decree that failed to explicitly name 
the plan that the order pertained to and failed to specify how the proceeds were to 
be divided between alternate payees was nevertheless sufficient to qualify as a 
QDRO because there was no ambiguity about how to dispense the proceeds of the 
ERISA plan. Id. In that case, the divorce decree simply referred to the plan at issue 
as “the life insurance [that] is presently carried through his/her employer.” Id. at 
1081. In so holding, the court stated the following: 
It is asking too much of domestic relations lawyers and judges to 
expect them to dot every i and cross every t in formulating divorce 
decrees that have ERISA implications. Ideally, every domestic 
relations lawyer should be conversant with ERISA, but it is 
unrealistic to expect all of them to be. We do not think Congress 
meant to ask the impossible, not the literally, but the humanly, 
impossible, or to make a suit for legal malpractice the sole recourse 
of an ERISA beneficiary harmed by a lawyer’s failure to navigate 
the treacherous shoals with which the modern state-federal law of 
employee benefits abounds. 
Id. at 1085. 
  The Ninth Circuit came to a similar conclusion when presented with the 
question of what degree of compliance with the REA will suffice to have a 
domestic-relations order deemed a QDRO. Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit 
Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 1143, 1149–55 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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criteria by which a domestic-relations order will qualify as a 
QDRO,330 litigating the issue will cost the client time and money. 
This can be avoided by making a QDRO checklist for each 
domestic-relations order. The first four items on the checklist should 
include: (1) the names and addresses of the participant and the 
alternate payee; (2) the amount or percentage of the participant’s 
benefits to be paid by the plan to the alternate payee, or how the 
amount or percentage will be calculated; (3) the number of payments 
or payment periods; and (4) each plan covered by the order.331 Next, 
confirm that the order does not do any of the following: (1) require 
the plan to provide benefits that it does not otherwise provide 
according to its terms; (2) obligate the plan to increase the benefits 
provided; or (3) eliminate benefits that are designated under a 
preexisting QDRO.332 These requirements exist “to ‘spare the plan 
administrator from litigation-fomenting ambiguities [about] who the 
beneficiaries . . . are.’”333  
With all that said, who is responsible to draft the order that will 
be submitted to the plan administrator for a QDRO determination?334 
The domestic-relations judge will not draft the order.335 
Understanding QDROs requires knowledge of the tax and labor 
portions of ERISA. These areas of law arise infrequently in state 
court; thus, the judge who signs off on a domestic-relations order 
may not be familiar with the inner workings of ERISA or the REA. 
Similarly, plan administrators will not draft QDROs.336 
Administrators do not have to be lawyers,337 and even if one is, then 
the administrator should not act as the attorney for either party in 
                                                 
 330. Hawkins v. Comm’r, 86 F.3d 982, 988–90 (10th Cir. 1996). Even courts 
that are generally more conservative in their approach to ERISA requirements 
nonetheless caution against unduly narrow interpretations of the language within a 
domestic-relations order. Id. In rejecting a narrower approach by the Tax Court, the 
Tenth Circuit reasoned that nothing in the plain language of 26 U.S.C. § 
414(p)(1)(A)(i) (the IRS counterpart to ERISA) mandates that domestic-relations 
lawyers literally mimic the statutory language when drafting orders intended to be 
QDROs. Id. at 990. 
 331. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(i)–(iv). 
 332. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(i)–(iii). 
 333. In re Williams, 50 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
 334. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 97–99. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 98. 
 337. Blue v. UAL Corp., 160 F.3d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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addition to drafting the order.338 Rather, the administrator might 
provide a model order and comment on whether a submitted order 
qualifies as a QDRO, but that is all anyone is going to get out of the 
administrator.339 
The attorney for the plan participant will not draft the QDRO 
either.340 The plan participant has a lot to lose and nothing to gain 
with the entry of a QDRO.341 He or she stands to lose part or all of 
his or her retirement benefits to an ex-spouse; thus, the participant 
hopes that a QDRO is never entered.342 Therefore, it is unreasonable 
to expect the participant’s lawyer to actively assist in assigning part 
or all of what is probably his or her client’s most significant asset.343 
That leaves one other person responsible for the drafting: the 
attorney for the alternate payee.344 It is malpractice to fail to draft a 
domestic-relations order and to have it qualified by the plan 
administrator for the correct amounts specified by the domestic-
relations court.345 When an attorney represents an alternate payee, 
then it is the attorney’s professional and ethical responsibility “to 
make sure that the [drafting and] qualification process is followed 
through to successful completion.”346 
B. Delay in Drafting the QDRO 
The next question is when should the attorney draft the order—
before, during, or after the divorce proceedings? The answer is “as 
soon as possible.”347 Being dilatory in sending a domestic-relations 
order to a plan administrator for qualification has been the subject of 
malpractice actions and attorney disciplinary proceedings.348 
                                                 
 338. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 98. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. Also, the participant is unlikely to want to pay his lawyer for doing this. 
Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 98–99. 
 347. Id. at 99. 
 348. Id. (citing Payne v. GM/UAW Pension Plan, No. 95-CV-73554DT, 1996 
WL 943424, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. May 7, 1996); Layton v. TDS Healthcare Sys. 
Corp., No. C-93-1827-MHP, 1994 WL 224352, at *1–5 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 1994); 
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Litigation has also resulted from disparities between what the 
domestic-relations court ordered or what the parties agreed to 
compared to what the QDRO divided.349 The longer an attorney waits 
to draft the order, the greater the likelihood that something will be 
omitted from or added to the order that differs from the parties’ 
agreement or the court’s directives.350 
In contested matters, the order should be drafted prior to a 
property-division hearing.351 Often the parties agree on most aspects 
of the order “except the percentage or dollar amount . . . the 
[a]lternate [p]ayee [will receive].”352 This is not an appropriate 
reason for delay. The attorney should draft the parts of the order that 
reflect the parties’ agreement, then submit it to the plan administrator 
with the dollar amount or percentage left blank and a notation stating 
that it will be completed at a later date.353 The plan administrator will 
not be able to deem the draft a QDRO without the dollar amount or 
percentage, but this does provide the drafter a chance to learn of any 
other problems with the draft.354 
Another issue that might arise if an order is not drafted on a 
timely basis is that the participant may terminate his or her 
employment.355 If the participant quits his job and has a defined-
contribution plan like a 401(k) or 403(b), then he may be able to start 
                                                                                                                 
Williams v. Law Firm of Cooch & Taylor, No. 92C-03-024, 1994 WL 234000, at 
*1–4 (Del. Super. Ct. May 11, 1994); Carter v. Carter, 869 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1994); Cuyahoga Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Williamson, 652 N.E.2d 972 (Ohio 
1995); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Louderman, 601 N.W.2d 625 (Wis. 
1999)). 
 349. Id. at 99–100 (citing Fortmann v. Avon Prods., Inc., No. 97 C 5286, 1999 
WL 160258, at *1–9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 1999); Layton v. TDS Healthcare Sys. 
Corp., No. C-93-1827-MHP, 1994 WL 224352, at *1–5 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 1994); 
Holloman v. Holloman, 691 So. 2d 897 (Miss. 1996); Carpenter v. Carpenter, No. 
01-94-01113-CV, 1996 WL 417648, at *1–6 (Tex. App. 1996); Wilson v. Wilson, 
492 S.E.2d 495 (Va. App. 1997)). 
 350. Id. at 99. 
 351. Id. at 100. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. The United States Department of Labor encourages plan administrators 
to provide advice and guidance to attorneys preparing domestic-relations orders as 
early as possible in domestic-relations proceedings. QDROs: The Division of 
Retirement Benefits Through Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, supra note 9, at 
Questions 2-1, 2-5, 2-7. 
 355. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 16.02[B]. 
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drawing funds from the plan immediately.356 Once a distribution is 
made to a participant, it is too late for a QDRO to effectively obtain 
the alternate payee’s marital- or community-property share.357 One 
possible remedy is to serve a subpoena duces tecum on the plan to 
see if there are any funds remaining in the plan.358 If the plan funds 
have been depleted, then the alternate payee cannot use a QRDO to 
obtain what she would have received had there been money 
remaining in the participant’s account.359 
If a participant does not terminate his or her employment prior to 
the entry of a QDRO, then the participant may choose to retire.360 If 
this happens and the participant chooses to receive benefits in the 
form of a single-life annuity361 with no survivor benefit, then each 
day that goes by until a QDRO is entered costs the alternate payee the 
benefits that she would have otherwise received because the 
participant will receive payments with no obligation to share them 
with the alternate payee.362 When the QDRO is eventually entered, it 
is possible for the alternate payee to recover lost payments, but only 
on a prospective basis because ERISA forbids retroactive 
payments.363 For example, if an alternate payee lost $1,000 because 
the retiring participant chose a single-life annuity before the entry of 
a QDRO, then the QDRO can include a provision stating that the 
alternate payee will receive an additional amount per month until the 
$1,000 is fully recovered.364 The participant, however, must consent 
to this. If there is no consent, then the matter must be decided by a 
court, and it is not the most tenable position to argue that the alternate 
payee should receive lost money despite the fact that his or her 
lawyer failed to draft the order before the participant retired. 
There is a second problem for alternate payees when it comes to 
the retirement of participants before the entry of a QDRO—the loss 
                                                 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. § 16.02[C]. 
 361. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (providing that a single-
life annuity is an annuity payable for the life of one person). 
 362. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 16.02[C]. 
 363. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(iv). 
 364. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 16.02[C]. 
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of a lifetime stream of income.365 When a participant chooses a 
single-life annuity, payments cease when the participant dies.366 A 
properly drafted QDRO can require the participant to choose a 
qualified joint-and-survivor annuity,367 which would guarantee the 
alternate payee a lifetime stream of payments. It is essential to have 
the QDRO entered before the participant retires; otherwise, the 
alternate payee has to hope that the participant outlives her so that she 
can receive a lifetime stream of payments.368 
The death of the plan participant before the entry of a QDRO 
could also have adverse consequences for an alternate payee.369 Some 
plan administrators take the position that an order cannot be qualified 
as a QDRO if the participant dies before the QDRO qualification 
process is complete. 370 If this happens, then there are two things that 
the alternate payee’s attorney can do. 
First, if occurs, a court may construe the divorce decree, property-
settlement agreement, or separation agreement as a QDRO if enough 
information is included about the identities and addresses of the 
participant and the alternate payee, the duration and amount of 
benefits owed to the alternate payee, and the name of the benefit 
plan.371 Likewise, if one of the foregoing documents contains 
survivorship-benefits language, then a plan administrator may agree 
to lifetime benefits for the alternate payee.372 
Second, the plan might accept a nunc pro tunc373 QDRO.374 If so, 
the alternate payee’s benefits might not be jeopardized. If the plan 
does not accept nunc pro tunc QDROs, then it might be worth suing 
the plan to put the matter before a judge, depending on the federal 
circuit where the case is. Some circuits hold the view that 
                                                 
 365. Id. 
 366. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(iv). 
 367. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d)(1). 
 368. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 16.02[C]. 
 369. Id. § 16.02[D]. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. 
 373. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (9th ed. 2009) (defining nunc pro tunc as 
“[h]aving retroactive legal effect through a court’s inherent power”).  
 374. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 16.02[D]. 
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posthumous QDROs that otherwise comply with the REA are 
acceptable,375 but others have held that they are not.376 
                                                 
 375. Patton v. Denver Post Corp., 326 F.3d 1148, 1152–54 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(stating that an ex-spouse’s retroactively dated QDRO to before the plan 
participant’s death is valid); Hogan v. Raytheon, Co., 302 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 
2002) (allowing for posthumous entry of a QDRO where the plan had notice prior 
to death, but notice was not essential to validity); Trs. of the Dirs. Guild of Am.–
Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 425–26 nn.9–10 (9th Cir. 
2000). The Tise court held that a post-death QDRO is valid, provided that the plan 
has notice before death of the impending claim. Id. The court did not decide 
whether a QDRO could issue after a participant’s death if the plan had no notice of 
the domestic-relations order prior to the death. Id. The court also did not decide 
whether the state court properly granted a nunc pro tunc order or whether the Full 
Faith and Credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, would require a federal court to honor a 
nunc pro tunc order. Id. But see Carmona v. Carmona, 544 F.3d 988, 993, 998, 
1000–04 (9th Cir. 2008). In Carmona, the Ninth Circuit appeared to have moved 
away from Tise when it followed Hopkins v. AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co., 105 
F.3d 153, 157 (4th Cir. 1997), but did not adopt its entire rationale. Carmona, 544 
F.3d at 993. The court held that a participant’s spouse has an irrevocable right to a 
qualified joint-and-survivor annuity on the annuity start date, and that right cannot 
be assigned to a subsequent spouse. Id. The court identified the question before it 
as “whether a . . . ‘participant’s retirement cuts off [the] putative alternate payee’s 
right to obtain [a] . . . QDRO’ with [respect] to . . . surviving spouse benefits.” Id. 
at 1000. The court said that Tise left that question open. Id. at 1001. The court did, 
however, reaffirm its holding in Tise that as long as a valid domestic-relations order 
creates an alternate payee’s legally enforceable property right in a pre-retirement 
survivor annuity, a posthumous QDRO can be obtained. Id. at 1004. See also 
Torres v. Torres, 60 P.3d 798, 805–06, 817, 822–23 (Haw. 2002). The Supreme 
Court of Hawaii relied on Tise to hold that survivor benefits did not vest in the 
participant’s widow on the date of his eligibility for retirement or upon his death. 
Torres, 60 P.3d at 822. The court affirmed the trial court’s order amending the 
initial divorce decree after the participant’s death so it could be qualified as a 
QDRO, stating that “[a]s long as ERISA’s qualification requirements are met, any 
DRO permissible under state domestic-relations law should be binding upon a 
pension plan.” Id. at 817. 
 376. Samaroo v. Samaroo, 193 F.3d 185, 186, 190–91 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating 
that a posthumous QDRO is invalid). But see Files v. ExxonMobil Pension Plan, 
428 F.3d 478, 479, 487–88 (3d Cir. 2005). In Files, the Third Circuit retreated from 
the full implications of Samaroo, reiterating that Samaroo was “expressly limited 
to its facts.” Files, 428 F.3d at 487. The court held that a property-settlement 
agreement granting an unmarried pension-plan participant’s former spouse a 
separate interest in 50% of the participant’s pension as of the date of the agreement 
constituted a QDRO pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (2006), “providing the ex-
wife with a separate interest in the pension benefit prior to her ex-husband’s death.” 
Id. at 479. The court concluded that Samaroo did not control because the former 
spouse in Files was seeking a survivorship benefit provided for in the agreement. 
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C. Insufficient Understanding of How Annuities Are Divided 
If an ERISA-qualified plan offers the employee the option to 
receive his benefits in the form of an annuity, then there are typically 
three ways for the annuity to be paid: “(1) as a Single Life Annuity 
for the Participant’s life only[;] (2) as a Qualified Joint and Survivor 
Annuity for the lives of the Participant and the Alternate Payee[;] or 
(3) as a Qualified and Joint Survivor Annuity involving the 
Participant and his new spouse.”377 Regardless of how the annuity is 
ultimately paid, the present actuarial value for the different payment 
methods must be the same so that the total amount that the plan pays 
will be the same.378 “Present Actuarial Value is [today’s] value . . . of 
an amount of money on hand in the future . . . or a stream of 
payments [owed] in the future.”379 For example: If you have $10 and 
invest it at 5% annual interest, then in one year it will be worth 
$10.50, which makes the present value of $10.50 one year from now 
equal to $10 in current dollars.380 
Similarly, a fixed amount in current dollars can be compared to a 
series of future payments.381 For example: Using the same 5% annual 
interest rate mentioned above, if a person makes payments of $10 per 
month for twelve consecutive months and starts those payments in 
four years, then she will need to have $121.55 four years from now to 
fund those future payments.382 Hence, “the present value of a stream 
of [twelve] monthly payments of $10 . . . starting four years from 
today[] is $100.”383 Thus, one can say that “the value of $100 on 
hand today and the value of a stream of [twelve] monthly payments 
                                                                                                                 
Id. at 487. The court also distinguished Hopkins v. AT&T Global Info. Solutions 
Co., 105 F.3d 153, 157 (4th Cir. 1997), on the grounds that Hopkins involved “an 
attempt to divest benefits already vested in a subsequent spouse, whereas [in Files], 
there was no such vesting.” Id. at 487–88 n.12. See also Rivers v. Cent. & S. W. 
Corp., 186 F.3d 681, 683 (5th Cir. 1999) (ruling that a post-retirement QDRO is not 
valid); Hopkins v. AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co., 105 F.3d 153, 157 (4th Cir. 
1997) (ruling that a post-retirement QDRO is not valid). 
 377. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 80. 
 378. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(ii) (2006). Under ERISA, a plan cannot be 
required to provide increased benefits to an alternate payee determined on the basis 
of actuarial value. Id. 
 379. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 74. 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. at 75. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. 
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of $10 each commencing four years from today are actuarially 
equivalent.”384 It is also possible to compare the values of two 
different series of payments to be made in the future to determine if 
one series is equal to the other on an actuarial basis.385 
For example: A fifty-five-year-old man (Husband) has a forty-
year-old wife (Wife).386 He plans to retire at the age of sixty-five and 
receive pension payments of $1,000 per month for the remainder of 
his life.387 His life expectancy is eighty.388 Husband and Wife are in a 
divorce proceeding, and she wants to start receiving her marital share 
of his pension payments now.389 Her life expectancy is eighty-five.390 
The domestic-relations court enters an order awarding Wife 50% of 
Husband’s pension benefits.391 It would be a serious error to 
conclude that she is entitled to $500 of his $1,000 monthly 
payment.392 She will start receiving her stream of payments now, but 
he will not start receiving his for a decade. Once the payments start, 
her income stream will last for forty-five years, while his will last for 
fifteen years.393 Because her income stream starts earlier and will last 
longer than his, her payments must be less than $500 to comply with 
ERISA’s mandate that a QDRO cannot order a plan to pay more in 
benefits than the plan provides.394 In fact, her payments must be 
significantly less than $500 as demonstrated by the following 
example. At an annual interest rate of 5%, her payments would have 
to be $178.90 per month for forty-five years to be actuarially 
equivalent to the $821.10 per month that the Husband will start 
getting ten years after she starts receiving her payments.395 This 
circumstance exists because she will start receiving payments a 
decade before he starts receiving his, and she will get paid for forty-
five years compared to his fifteen.396 
                                                 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. at 76. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id. 
 394. Id. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. 
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For readers who are domestic-relations practitioners and not 
financial analysts, statisticians, or actuaries—do not panic. ERISA 
does not mandate that an attorney be an actuary to draft a QDRO.397 
An attorney, however, does have to understand actuarial equivalence 
and how it relates to interest rates, timing of payments, and mortality 
rates.398 Just remember the basics: The longer the payments last, the 
smaller they have to be; conversely, the shorter the payments last, the 
larger the payments must be. If you start with the amount that will be 
used to make a series of periodic future payments, then those 
payments can be made by paying the recipient a larger amount for a 
shorter period of time or a smaller amount for a longer period of 
time.399 Now, back to dividing annuities. 
As previously mentioned, there are typically three ways for a plan 
participant to receive his annuity payments: “(1) as a Single Life 
Annuity for the Participant’s life only[;] (2) as a Qualified Joint and 
Survivor Annuity for the lives of the Participant and the Alternate 
Payee[;] or (3) as a Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity involving 
the Participant and his new spouse.”400 Once an election is made 
from the three choices, there are five distinct methods of splitting the 
payments between the participant and his or her former spouse.401 
1. Participant is Retired and Receiving Payments 
If the participant is retired and receiving payments from her plan, 
then an alternate payee has no options regarding the form or amount 
of benefits that she will receive because the plan started making 
payments to the participant based on certain actuarial assumptions, 
and the plan is entitled to rely on those assumptions.402 The plan 
administrator cannot be compelled to actuarially adjust the alternate 
                                                 
 397. Id. at 76. 
 398. Id. at 76–77. 
 399. Id. at 80–81. 
 400. Id. at 80. 
 401. Id. at 81. 
 402. Id. But see In re Marriage of Allison, 234 Cal. Rptr. 671, 674 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1987) Under California law, “one spouse [could not], by invoking a condition 
wholly within his control, defeat the community interest of the other spouse[,]” and 
“[b]y opting to retire in the brief period between the judgment of dissolution and 
the division of property, [the] husband attempted to do just that.” Id. The court 
remedied the situation by awarding the wife a monetary amount equal to the 
actuarial value of her forfeited interest. Id. 
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payee’s payments to last for her lifetime.403 Under this circumstance, 
payments to the alternate payee will cease on the participant’s 
death.404 
2. Single-Life Annuity on the Life of the Participant 
If the participant is still working and chooses a single-life annuity 
based on his life expectancy, then he will start receiving payments 
when the he retires, and payments will end at his death.405 The 
alternate payee facing this situation has to hope that the participant 
outlives her if she wants to receive benefits for her lifetime.406 
3. Qualified Joint-and-Survivor Annuity on the Lives of the 
Participant and Alternate Payee 
This approach guarantees the alternate payee a lifetime stream of 
payments. To secure this benefit, however, the attorney must insert 
language in a QDRO that designates the alternate payee as the spouse 
of the participant for the purpose of having the participant elect a 
qualified joint-and-survivor annuity with the alternate payee.407 
4. Qualified Joint-and-Survivor Annuity on the Lives of the 
Participant and the New Spouse 
If the participant is remarried, then he may choose to elect a 
qualified joint-and-survivor annuity with his current spouse.408 This 
does not preclude the former spouse from receiving a stream of 
payments that can continue past the participant’s death.409 Payments 
to the alternate payee will continue until the later of the death of the 
participant or his current spouse, but only if appropriate language is 
included in a QDRO.410 
                                                 
 403. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 83. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. at 82. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a)(1), (d) (2006 & Supp. II 2009); 29 U.S.C. § 
1056(d)(3)(F) (2006). 
 408. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 82; 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2). 
 409. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 82. 
 410. Id. at 82–83. 
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5. Single-Life Annuity on the Life of the Alternate Payee 
This is the preference of a majority of alternate payees because it 
gives them complete control over when the payments start, and there 
is no risk of outliving the payments.411 
It is essential that attorneys in domestic-relations proceedings 
explain these options and the consequences flowing from each one to 
their clients.412 This can be quite the task depending on the client’s 
level of education and sophistication. Moreover, depending on what 
might happen to the participant’s employment or life prior to the 
entry of a QDRO, an alternate payee’s options can be narrowed 
significantly. Thus, it is vital to have an order drafted and qualified as 
soon as possible to preserve the maximum number of options for the 
client. 
D. Uncritically Using the Plan’s Model QDRO 
Many plan administrators will provide attorneys with a company-
generated model QDRO. This is done in part to follow Department of 
Labor guidelines413 that require plan administrators to provide 
information about plans and plan benefits as early as possible in 
domestic-relations proceedings.414 Mostly though, this is done so that 
the administrator’s review and approval of the order as a QDRO will 
be easier and less costly.415 Plan administrators want to simplify their 
work and minimize the costs associated with the review-and-approval 
process. Therefore, the model orders provided to lawyers are not 
designed to obtain the maximum benefits for alternate payees—that 
is the responsibility and duty of the alternate payee’s lawyer.416 A 
plan administrator cannot, however, refuse to qualify a domestic-
relations order simply because the drafter did not use the company’s 
                                                 
 411. Id. at 83. 
 412. Id. at 96. 
 413. The Department of Labor has issued QDRO “guidelines” rather than 
regulations because the authority to issue ERISA regulations lies with the 
Department of the Treasury. See, e.g., CARRAD, supra note 9, at 407; Gen. Motors 
Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 461–62 (6th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). 
 414. QDROs: The Division of Retirement Benefits Through Qualified Domestic 
Relations Orders, supra note 9, Question 2-1. 
 415. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 100–01; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 13.01. 
 416. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 100–01; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 13.01. 
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model form.417 The administrator must accept any domestic-relations 
order that satisfies the REA’s QDRO requirements.418 The following 
are frequent omissions from employers’ model QDROs.419 
1. No Survivorship Protection 
Typically, model QDROs do not include clauses that provide 
survivorship benefits to alternate payees such as qualified pre-
retirement survivor annuities (QPSA) or qualified joint-and-survivor 
annuities (QJSA).420 To guarantee that the alternate payee will 
receive benefits after the participant’s death, the QDRO must 
explicitly state that the alternate payee will be treated as the 
participant’s surviving spouse with respect to a QPSA and QJSA to 
the extent of her assigned benefits under the QDRO.421 Some 
employers pay the costs associated with providing their employees 
with a pre-retirement-annuity benefit.422 Some, however, do not.423 
Regardless, to make sure the benefit remains available to an alternate 
payee, her lawyer must include language in the QDRO that requires 
the participant to maintain coverage for the life of the benefit or bars 
him from opting out of such coverage.424 
                                                 
 417. QDROs: The Division of Retirement Benefits Through Qualified Domestic 
Relations Orders, supra note 9, Question 2-7. 
 418. Id. Likewise, an administrator cannot reject a domestic-relations order 
because the order omits information within the administrator’s knowledge or 
information that he can easily obtain from a simple phone call, fax, or email to the 
lawyer who submitted the order. Id. Nevertheless, the drafter should try to be 
scrupulous in complying with the QDRO requirements because each day that the 
QDRO is not entered could work to the detriment of the client, particularly if she is 
an alternate payee. Id. 
 419. See text accompanying notes 420–551, infra. 
 420. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 102–03; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 13.01[A]. 
 421. See CARRAD, supra note 9, at 102–03; see also RAYMOND S. DIETRICH, 
QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDERS: STRATEGY AND LIABILITY FOR THE 
FAMILY LAW ATTORNEY § 1.02 (9th ed. 2009); DAVID A. PRATT & SHARON REECE, 
ERISA AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW—THE ESSENTIALS 435–36 (2010); 
SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 13.02[A]–[C]. 
 422. See, e.g., CARRAD, supra note 9, at 72. 
 423. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 13.01[A]. 
 424. See generally DIETRICH, supra note 421, § 1.02; PRATT & REECE, supra 
note 421, at 435–42; SCHNEIDER & PINHEIRO, supra note 30, § 3.11[B]; SHULMAN, 
supra note 16, § 13.01[A]. 
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2. No Division of the Participant’s Tax Basis in Defined-Contribution 
Plans 
Employees can make contributions to defined-contribution plans 
on a before-tax and after-tax basis, and the employer can also make 
contributions.425 Employees benefit from after-tax contributions 
because when they receive distributions, they pay taxes not on the 
entire distribution, but on the difference between the entire 
distribution and the amount of the distribution constituting after-tax 
contributions.426 For example: If a person sells an asset for more than 
she paid for it, then she will not owe taxes on the entire sale price; 
rather, she will owe taxes on the difference between the sale price 
and the price she originally paid for the asset before she sold it.427 
The asset price that she originally paid is called her basis.428 
Likewise, the total of an employee’s after-tax contribution to her 
retirement plan is considered her basis; thus, she is not taxed a second 
time when she receives a withdrawal containing after-tax 
contributions.429 An alternate payee who is entitled to receive 50% of 
a participant’s plan benefits should insist on receiving 50% of the 
participant’s basis; otherwise, she will end up with less than 50% of 
the assets because of the tax consequences.430 
For example: Assume that a participant has $200,000 in a 401(k) 
or 403(b) that a court divides equally between him and his spouse, 
and his basis in that balance is $40,000.431 Assume further that both 
parties are in a 31% individual income-tax bracket.432 If the alternate 
payee receives no part of the participant’s tax basis, then her post-tax 
share of the benefits will be $69,000 ($100,000 marital share – 31% 
tax of $31,000).433 The participant’s post-tax share will be $81,400 
($100,000 marital share – $40,000 basis = $60,000 taxable amount; 
31% tax on $60,000 = $18,600; $100,000 marital share – $18,600 tax 
= $81,400).434 A person would have an extremely difficult, if not 
                                                 
 425. See PRATT & REECE, supra note 421, at 323–25. 
 426. See id. 
 427. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 103. 
 428. PRATT & REECE, supra note 421, at 325. 
 429. Id. 
 430. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 103–04. 
 431. Id. 
 432. Id. 
 433. Id. 
 434. Id. at 103–04, 147–48. 
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impossible, time explaining to an alternate payee why she received 
$12,400 less than her ex-spouse when a court explicitly ordered that 
she receive one-half of a $200,000 benefit. 
To avoid this disparity, the attorney should include a provision in 
the QDRO that grants the alternate payee a percentage of the 
participant’s tax basis equal to the percentage of the plan assets 
assigned to her in the order.435 The language can simply state that the 
alternate payee should receive 50% (or whatever percent she received 
of the participant’s plan benefits) of the participant’s basis in his 
account as of a certain date.436 This difference is significant, as 
demonstrated using the facts from the previous example: The 
participant has $200,000 in a 401(k) or 403(b) that a court divides 
equally between him and his spouse, and his basis in that balance is 
$40,000. Both parties are in a 31% tax bracket. If the alternate payee 
receives one-half of the participant’s tax basis, then her after-tax 
share of the benefits will be $75,200 ($100,000 marital share – 
20,000 one-half of the participant’s basis = $80,000 taxable amount; 
31% tax on $80,000 = $24,800; $100,000 marital share – $24,800 tax 
= $75,200). The participant’s after-tax share will also be $75,200 
($100,000 marital share – $20,000 one half basis = $80,000 taxable 
amount; 31% tax on $80,000 = $24,800; $100,000 marital share – 
$24,800 tax = $75,200). 
Most employers’ model QDROs do not contain a provision 
addressing the allocation of the participant’s tax basis because the 
plan has no reason to concern itself with the parties’ tax situations.437 
The alternate payee’s attorney has a duty to ensure that she is not 
short-changed by failing to receive her marital share of her former 
spouse’s tax basis. Relying on the employer’s model QDRO will not 
fulfill this duty. 
3. No Provision for Cost-of-Living Adjustments 
Some plan participants who receive monthly payments from their 
benefit plans receive periodic increases in those payments to offset 
the effects of inflation. These increases are called cost-of-living 
adjustments.438 Hardly any model QDROs will include a provision 
                                                 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. 
 437. Id. 
 438. Id. at 104; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 13.02[I]. 
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granting the alternate payee a share of the participant’s cost-of-living 
adjustments.439 This benefits the participant because she will receive 
not only her share of the increase, but also her former spouse’s share. 
This result can be avoided, however, by including language in the 
QDRO that awards the alternate payee a pro rata share of the 
participant’s cost-of-living adjustments.440 
4. No Early Retirement Subsidy Allocation 
Some employers offer their employees an attractive monetary 
incentive to retire early.441 For example: If a company’s pension plan 
allows a worker to retire at age sixty and still receive the same 
benefits that he would have received at the normal retirement age,442 
then the company is subsidizing the employee's early retirement.443 
Under the ERISA provision addressing the form and payment of 
benefits,444 an alternate payee who elects to start receiving monthly 
payments after the participant reaches the plan-defined earliest 
retirement age,445 but before he actually retires, cannot receive a 
share of the early retirement subsidy.446 This is because the employer 
offered the subsidy to entice workers to retire earlier than they would 
have otherwise. And unless the workers do retire, the employer will 
                                                 
 439. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 104; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 13.02[I]. 
 440. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 104; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 13.02[I]. 
 441. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 104–05; DIETRICH, supra note 421, § 10.04[4]; 
PRATT & REECE, supra note 421, at 126–28; SCHNEIDER & PINHEIRO, supra note 
30, § 3.13[A]; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 13.02[C]. 
 442. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (2006) (providing that normal retirement age means 
“the earlier of (A) the time a plan participant attains normal retirement age under 
the plan, or (B) the later of (i) the time a plan participant attains age 65, or (ii) the 
5th anniversary of the time a plan participant commenced participation in the 
plan”). In order to make sense of this definition, calculate it backwards, i.e., first 
decide the later of parts (B)(i) and (B)(ii), then compare that to part (A). CARRAD, 
supra note 9, at 14–15. Calculate the date of the fifth anniversary of the date the 
participant joined the plan (which may not coincide with the start of employment 
because ERISA allows employers to require their employees to work for one year 
before participating in the retirement plan). Id. at 15. Next, determine the date the 
participant will turn sixty-five, and select the later of these two dates. Id. Compare 
that date with the date that the participant will reach the normal retirement age 
specified in the text of the plan, and choose the earlier of these two dates. Id. 
 443. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 104–05; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 13.02[C]. 
 444. 29 U.S.C. § 1056. 
 445. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(ii). 
 446. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(i)(II). 
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not get what it paid for. Therefore, it would not be fair for the 
employer to be forced to pay the alternate payee part of an early 
retirement subsidy that it did not benefit from offering.447 
On the other hand, if the alternate payee chooses to start receiving 
payments after the participant reaches the plan-defined early 
retirement age and the participant retires before the plan-defined 
normal retirement age, then the employer will owe the participant the 
early retirement subsidy.448 In this instance, the alternate payee can 
receive a proportionate share of the early retirement subsidy, but only 
if the QDRO explicitly says that she can.449 The employer’s model 
QDRO almost never contains language awarding the alternate payee 
her proportionate share of the participant’s early retirement subsidy 
when the participant retires after reaching the early retirement age but 
before the normal retirement age.450 The alternate payee’s lawyer will 
have to make sure that the QDRO includes such language.451 
5. Provision for Misdirected Payments 
Despite ever-advancing technology and the highly developed 
knowledge, skill, and sophistication of plan administrators, mistakes 
can still happen in the process of paying benefits to participants and 
alternate payees.452 Occasionally, a plan may send a payment 
intended for the alternate payee to the participant instead.453 The 
plan’s model QDRO will not address what should be done in this 
instance because the plan’s only concern is to avoid overpayment.454 
Language should be included in the QDRO that requires the 
participant who receives a payment intended for the alternate payee 
to return the money to the plan administrator with a request that the 
funds be forwarded to the alternate payee.455 The participant should 
not forward the payment to the alternate payee directly because the 
party receiving the payment is responsible for paying the income 
                                                 
 447. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 105. 
 448. Id.; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 13.02[C]. 
 449. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 105; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 13.02[C]. 
 450. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 105; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 13.02[C]. 
 451. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 105; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 13.02[C]. 
 452. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 11.06[N]. 
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 454. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 106. 
 455. Id. at 105–06; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 11.06[N]. 
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taxes on the payment.456 If the participant does not involve the plan 
administrator in correcting the misdirected payment, then the 
participant will owe taxes on the payment intended for the alternate 
payee.457 
The plan administrator can spare the participant any unwanted tax 
consequences by forwarding the misdirected payment to the alternate 
payee and then issuing the participant an IRS Form 1099 that would 
relieve him of any taxes associated with the misdirected payment.458 
The language regarding the Form 1099 should be included with the 
language that requires the participant to return misdirected payments 
to the plan administrator.459 
6. The 10% Penalty on Early Distributions 
Following a divorce, many alternate payees want immediate 
access to their shares of their ex-spouses’ retirement benefits. It is 
possible for them to get their money immediately, but they should be 
advised that doing so will trigger a 10% penalty that is payable if a 
distribution is taken from an ERISA-qualified plan before the 
participant reaches the age of fifty-nine.460 The plan’s model may 
state that the alternate payee will be paid directly from the plan, and 
this may be fine with the alternate payee if she is willing to pay the 
10% penalty.461 On the other hand, an alternate payee may not want 
to pay the penalty and instead may want her share of the benefits 
rolled over into an IRA or her own retirement plan.462 In this case, 
the QDRO must require the plan administrator to transfer the money 
from the plan into the IRA.463 If she wants her share of the benefits 
rolled over into her own retirement plan, then the QDRO must 
instruct the plan administrator to do so.464 
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The alternate payee should not take a payment directly from the 
plan and deposit the funds herself into an IRA or her own retirement 
plan.465 Once the money is in her hands, the 10% penalty is triggered 
regardless of how quickly she deposits it into an IRA or her own 
retirement plan.466 The QDRO should be properly drafted to avoid 
triggering the 10% early withdrawal penalty.467 
7. Always Using a Shared-Interest Approach with Defined-Benefit 
Plans 
a. Separate-Interest Approach 
Benefits payments under a defined-benefit plan will be made 
under a either a separate-interest approach or a shared-interest 
approach.468 Under the separate-interest approach, the amount of the 
alternate payee’s payments will be based on her life expectancy.469 
For example: A divorced participant retired with a monthly pension 
of $2,000, and the court awarded the alternate-payee, the participant’s 
former spouse, one-half of his monthly benefits based on a separate-
interest approach.470 The alternate payee is ten years younger than the 
participant.471 The alternate payee will not receive $1,000 per 
month;472 instead, she will receive about $700 per month because she 
will be paid over a longer period of time due to her longer life 
expectancy.473 A QDRO directing the plan to pay the alternate payee 
one-half of the participant’s monthly benefits for the alternate 
payee’s lifetime would be rejected by the plan administrator as 
violating ERISA’s prohibition against requiring the plan to pay 
increased benefits based on actuarial equivalence.474 
                                                 
 465. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 106. 
 466. Id. 
 467. Id. 
 468. DIETRICH, supra note 421, § 10.02; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 6.01. 
 469. DIETRICH, supra note 421, § 10.02[2]; PRATT & REECE, supra note 421, at 
130; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 6.01. 
 470. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 6.02. 
 471. Id. 
 472. Id. 
 473. Id. 
 474. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 6.02. A plan cannot be required to pay more in 
benefits than specified in the text of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(ii) (2006). 
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Another point to keep in mind is that even if the QDRO provides 
that the plan should use a separate-interest approach the language 
must be unambiguous.475 The drafter should not merely state that the 
QDRO is a separate-interest order.476 Instead, the drafter should 
provide that the parties intend to use a separate-interest approach and 
that the alternate payee’s benefits should be calculated based on her 
life expectancy.477 Also, a provision should be added stating that the 
alternate payee’s benefits will not end when the participant dies.478 
Under the separate-interest approach, the alternate payee can start 
receiving benefits before the participant retires, provided that the 
commencement date is on or after the participant reaches the earliest 
retirement age.479 If the alternate payee cannot wait or does not want 
to wait to start receiving benefits, then the separate-interest approach 
allows her to start receiving benefits at her discretion. But, she should 
be advised that if she starts receiving benefits before the participant 
reaches the earliest retirement age, then she will lose her entitlement 
to a proportionate share of his early retirement subsidy.480 The longer 
she waits to commence receiving benefits, the larger those benefits 
will be.481 The separate-interest approach is also advantageous to the 
participant.482 If the participant is single when he retires, then “he can 
                                                 
 475. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 6.02. 
 476. Id. 
 477. Id.  
 478. Id. 
 479. Id. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(ii) provides the following: 
[T]he term “earliest retirement age” means the earlier of—(I) the 
date on which the participant is entitled to a distribution under the 
plan, or (II) the later of [either] the date [that] the participant attains 
age 50 or the earliest date on which the participant could begin 
receiving benefits under the plan if the participant separated from 
service. 
§ 1056(d)(3)(E)(ii). 
  To make sense of this definition, calculate it backwards, i.e., first determine 
the later of the two dates in (II), i.e., the date the participant turns fifty-years-old 
and the earliest date he could begin receiving benefits under the plan if he separated 
from service. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 15. Next, compare that date to date in (I), 
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earliest of these two dates is the earliest retirement age. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 
15. 
 480. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 6.02[A]. 
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elect to receive benefits in the form of a single life annuity,” or if he 
is remarried, then he can provide survivorship coverage to his new 
spouse by choosing a qualified joint-and-survivor annuity based on 
his and her life.483 
A separate-interest QDRO must still include a provision for a 
QPSA484 to guarantee that the alternate payee will receive her share 
of the participant’s benefits if he dies before he retires or before he 
starts receiving benefits under the plan.485 With a properly drafted 
separate-interest QDRO, the alternate payee will receive a lifetime 
stream of income once the payments start. Her attorney, however, 
will need to make sure that those payments get started even if the 
participant dies before she does, and a provision granting her a QPSA 
will do just that.486 If the QDRO does not provide for pre-retirement 
annuity protection, then the alternate payee will stop receiving 
benefits when the participant dies.487 
A properly drafted separate-interest QDRO should not include a 
provision that grants the alternate payee a qualified joint-and-survivor 
annuity with the participant because she is already guaranteed a 
lifetime stream of income once the payments start.488 Granting her 
the lifetime guarantee and a qualified joint-and-survivor annuity 
would deprive the participant of his right to elect to do whatever he 
wants with his separate share, such as a single-life annuity on a non-
actuarially reduced basis or a qualified joint-and-survivor annuity 
with his current spouse.489  
b. Shared-Interest Approach 
The second way to divide pension payments under a defined-
benefit plan is the shared-interest approach.490 Under this approach, 
the alternate payee’s share of the participant’s benefits is not 
                                                 
 483. Id. 
 484. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e). 
 485. DIETRICH, supra note 421, § 10.04[1]; PRATT & REECE, supra note 421, at 
436, 439; SCHNEIDER & PINHEIRO, supra note 30 § 3.11[B][4]; SHULMAN, supra 
note 16, § 6.02[B]. 
 486. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 6.02[B]. 
 487. PRATT & REECE, supra note 421, at 132; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 
6.02[B] 
 488. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 6.02[B]. 
 489. Id. 
 490. Id. 
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actuarially adjusted to her life; rather, she shares in the participant’s 
benefits when he starts receiving them.491 This means that the 
alternate payee cannot start receiving benefits until the participant 
retires, and even then, the payments cease when the participant 
dies.492 The only way to keep the payments going after the death of 
the participant is to include pre-retirement and post-retirement 
survivorship clauses.493 For example: A participant is entitled to a 
$2,000 monthly benefit, and the court divides it evenly between the 
participant and the alternate payee, who is fifteen years younger. The 
alternate payee will receive $1,000 per month with no actuarial 
reduction because the benefits are tied to the participant’s life rather 
than her own. If a separate-interest QDRO is used instead, then she 
will receive $600 per month, but she will receive it for her lifetime. If 
she wants to receive the $1,000 monthly benefit for the remainder of 
her life, the participant has to outlive her.494 
An alternate payee in this situation should protect herself by 
having the QDRO provide for a QPSA and a QJSA.495 Using the 
preceding example, if the QDRO contains QPSA and QJSA clauses, 
then the pension plan would actuarially adjust the monthly pension 
from $2,000 per month to $1,800. The participant and the alternate 
payee would receive $900 per month while they are both living. If the 
participant predeceases the alternate payee, then the alternate payee 
will still receive $900 for her lifetime based on the QJSA provision in 
the QDRO. Likewise, if the participant dies before he starts receiving 
benefits from his pension, then a properly drafted QPSA clause will 
provide the alternate payee with a lifetime stream of actuarially 
adjusted pension payments.496 If a shared-interest QDRO does not 
include pre-retirement and post-retirement survivor protection for the 
alternate payee, then her payments will cease when the participant 
dies.497 If she wants a lifetime stream of payments under the shared-
interest approach, then the QDRO must include pre-retirement and 
post-retirement survivor-annuity protection. If the participant is 
retired and receiving pension payments at the time of divorce, then a 
                                                 
 491. Id. § 6.03. 
 492. DIETRICH, supra note 421, § 10.02[2]; SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 6.03. 
 493. SHULMAN, supra note 16, § 6.03. 
 494. Id. 
 495. Id. § 6.03[B]. 
 496. Id. 
 497. Id. § 6.03. 
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separate-interest approach is the only option available because “[i]t is 
too late [for the plan] to actuarially adjust the alternate payee’s 
benefits to her own life expectancy.”498 
The model orders of many plans are written using the shared-
interest approach, which vests the participant with control over the 
timing and receipt of benefits for the participant and the alternate 
payee.499 Plans do not do this to disadvantage the alternate payee; 
plans do this because the shared-interest approach is easier, less 
costly, and requires fewer actuarial calculations.500 This is yet 
another example of how blithely using the model order can be quite 
costly to the alternate payee. 
8. Assigning Vested Benefits Rather than Accrued Benefits 
The language of most model QDROs divides the participant’s 
“vested benefit rather than his accrued benefit.”501 The vested-benefit 
number is smaller than the accrued-benefit number.502 Benefits that 
have accrued but have yet to vest can be marital or community 
property. Thus, it is essential to divide the accrued number rather 
than the vested number.503 
9. Investment Gains and Losses in Defined-Contribution Plans 
A plan’s model order typically states that the balance of an 
alternate payee’s share of the participant’s account will include 
investment gains, losses, dividends, and interest from the date of 
division specified in the QDRO until the date that the alternate payee 
receives her share.504 An alternate payee may not want to assume the 
risk that her share of the participant’s account will decrease in value; 
therefore, she may want to eliminate the language adjusting her 
account for gains, losses, dividends, and interest. Of course, this 
means that she will not get the benefit of increases either. If she 
wants to take a chance that the account will make market gains, then 
she also must the risk that it will suffer market losses. 
                                                 
 498. Id. § 6.03[D]. 
 499. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 107. 
 500. Id. at 108. 
 501. Id. at 109. 
 502. Id. 
 503. Id. 
 504. Id. at 109–10. 
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10. Division of Year-End Contributions 
A considerable number of employers make yearly contributions 
to their employees’ retirement accounts.505 If the participant and 
alternate payee divorce in the middle of the plan year, then an 
adjustment will need to be made to properly divide this end-of-year 
employer contribution.506 For example: Acme’s pension plan’s fiscal 
year ends on September 30.507 On that day, the company contributed 
$12,000 to Husband’s account based on his service during the fiscal 
year.508 Husband and Wife get divorced on May 31, which is eight 
months into the fiscal year.509 Because Wife was married to Husband 
for 8/12 or 2/3 of the fiscal year for which Husband will receive an 
end-of-year contribution, she should receive 2/3 of the $12,000 or 
$8,000.510 
The employer’s model QDRO will not include adjustments for 
year-end contributions. The only way that the alternate payee will get 
her share of this marital asset is to include a provision in the QDRO 
that states she is entitled to a specific portion of employer 
contributions made to the participant’s account for any time that is 
attributable to the participant’s employment. This is true whether 
those contributions are made before or after the cutoff date for 
property division under state law.511 
11. Allocation of Forfeitures 
ERISA allows an employer to delay the vesting of contributions 
made by the employer to an employee’s retirement plan for up to 
seven years.512 The purpose of the delay is to incentivize employees 
to keep working for the employer.513 Once the employee becomes 
vested in a benefit, it is non-forfeitable.514 Conversely, as long as the 
benefit is accrued, but not vested, it can be lost if the employee quits 
                                                 
 505. Id. at 110. 
 506. Id. 
 507. Id. 
 508. Id. 
 509. Id. 
 510. Id. 
 511. Id. 
 512. Id. at 60. 
 513. Id. at 60–61. 
 514. SCHNEIDER & PINHEIRO, supra note 30, § 3.08. 
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or is fired.515 ERISA allows two vesting schedules, one for defined-
benefit plans516 and one for defined-contribution plans.517 These 
schedules set a floor, not a ceiling, on when vesting must occur; plans 
may offer vesting on a more accelerated basis if the employer 
chooses to do so.518 The schedules apply only to employer 
contributions; an employee is always entitled to the entirety of his or 
her contributions to his retirement plan.519 Likewise, if an employee 
dies or the plan terminates, then the employee becomes 100% vested 
in the employee's and the employer’s contributions.520 
Assume that Grady has $400 in a defined-contribution plan after 
he completes his fourth year of service.521 Following the ERISA 
vesting schedule for defined-contribution plans, Grady will be 60% 
vested in the employer’s contributions to his plan.522 If Grady quits or 
is fired at this point, then he would be entitled to $240, which is 60% 
of the employer’s contributions, leaving $160 in his plan.523 
Something must be done with this money, but it cannot simply be 
returned to the employer’s coffers as profit524 because the employer 
received a tax deduction for the $400 contribution it made to Grady’s 
plan. ERISA does not allow the employer to keep this money.525 
Instead, the $160 will be spread among the other plan participants on 
a pro rata basis, typically based on their salaries during the year.526 
                                                 
 515. Id. § 3.08[B]. 
 516. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). The vesting 
schedule is as follows: after three years of service the employee’s non-forfeitable 
percentage of the employer’s contributions is 20%; after four years, 40%; after five 
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1053(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 517. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). The vesting schedule is as follows: after 
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 518. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 60–61. 
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For example: Assume the plan in which Grady participates has 
two other participants: Fred and Lamont.527 When Grady’s 
employment ends and $160 of his $400 is forfeited, Fred earns 
$25,000 annually and Lamont earns $75,000.528 On the date that the 
forfeitures are allocated, Fred will receive 25% of the forfeited $160 
($40), and Lamont will receive 75% of the forfeited $160 ($120).529 
Forfeitures are typically allocated once per fiscal year based on 
events during the preceding two years.530 This is because ERISA 
requires plans to wait at least one year after the employee leaves to 
see if he returns. If the employee does, then he service will be 
considered uninterrupted, and he will not lose the non-vested portion 
of his plan account that he would have lost had the employee not 
returned.531 If the employee does not return within a year after 
leaving, then the plan is authorized to allocate the non-vested portion 
of his account to the remaining participants in the plan.532 The 
earliest this allocation can take place is the end of the plan’s next 
fiscal year following the one-year anniversary of the former 
employee’s cessation of employment. This can result in a two- to 
three-year delay in the allocation of forfeitures to the remaining 
participants.533 
A properly drafted QDRO should treat the allocation of 
forfeitures the same way that it treats year-end contributions, e.g., if 
Husband and Wife divorce during the middle of the plan’s fiscal year, 
then the forfeitures allocated to Husband’s account one or two years 
later should be divided into marital and nonmarital portions.534 The 
QDRO should state that an alternate payee will receive one-half of all 
forfeitures allocated to the participant’s plan account that were 
attributable to his service during the period ending on the date of 
divorce. This is the case whether the forfeitures are allocated to his 
plan before or after the cutoff date for the division of property under 
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state law.535 This is yet another consideration that will not be 
addressed in a plan’s model QDRO. 
12. Proper Handling of Loans in Defined-Contribution Plans 
A plan administrator must be instructed in the QDRO on how to 
handle outstanding loans against the participant’s account balance in 
a defined-contribution plan. ERISA authorizes two exceptions to its 
spendthrift clause: a QDRO and a revocable assignment of up to 10% 
of future benefits.536 Participants occasionally take out loans against 
their plans, and this must be considered when dividing a plan with an 
outstanding loan against it. From a lay person’s point of view, a loan 
is a liability. “From the plan’s point of view[, however,] a loan is an 
asset.”537 For example: A participant’s account balance consists of 
$100,000 in mutual funds and a $20,000 loan owed by the 
participant.538 If an alternate payee is awarded one-half of the 
account balance excluding the loan, then she will get $50,000 (50% 
of $100,000).539 On the other hand, if she is awarded one-half of the 
account including the loan, then she will get $60,000 (50% of 
$120,000).540 The loan is an account receivable to the plan but an 
account payable to the participant. The participant is repaying himself 
when he repays the loan. A QDRO that does not add loan amounts to 
the amount to be divided could significantly shortchange the alternate 
payee. It is the drafting lawyer’s responsibility to determine if there is 
a loan balance and then to make sure that the alternate payee receives 
her share of that account receivable. 
13. The PBGC and Defined-Benefit Plans 
ERISA established the PBGC to provide the pension-termination 
insurance that did not exist when the Studebaker plant closed on 
December 9, 1963, and terminated its defined-benefit plan.541 The 
PBGC “insures the pension benefits of a corporation’s employees if 
                                                 
 535. Id. at 64. 
 536. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (2006). 
 537. CARRAD, supra note 9, at 131. 
 538. Id. 
 539. Id. 
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 541. 29 U.S.C. § 1302; Dean, supra note 9, at 648; U.S. GOV’T 
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[the] company sponsoring an underfunded defined benefit pension plan 
becomes insolvent.”542 The PBGC “becomes trustee of the plan and its 
assets, and [it] is then responsible for investing those assets and paying 
benefits to the plan’s participants.”543 In 2010, the PBGC “paid nearly 
$5.6 billion for approximately 801,000 retirees in 4,200 failed 
plans.”544 
The PBGC will not pay plan benefits above certain limits, and in 
almost all cases, PBGC payments will be lower than plan payments. 
In 2011, the maximum monthly payment that the PBGC would make 
                                                 
 542. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 135. 
 543. Id. 
 544. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2010), available 
at http://www.pbgc.gov/Documents/2010_annual_report.pdf. The PBCG, however, 
has its own fiscal problems; in the first half of fiscal year 2009, the agency had a 
deficit in excess of $33 billion—an increase of more than $22 billion over the prior 
fiscal year’s $11 billion deficit. Press Release, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., PBGC 
Deficit Climbs to 33.5B at Mid-Year, Snowbarger to Tell Senate Panel (May 20, 
2009), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/releases/pr09-30.html. 
“The increase in the PBGC’s deficit is driven primarily by a drop in 
interest rates and by plan terminations, not by investment losses.” . . . 
“The PBGC has sufficient funds to meet its benefit obligations for 
many years because benefits are paid monthly over the lifetimes of 
beneficiaries, not as lump sums. Nevertheless, over the long term, the 
deficit must be addressed.” 
The $22.5 billion deficit increase was due primarily to about $11 
billion in completed and probable pension plan terminations; about 
$7 billion resulted from a decrease in the interest factor used to 
value liabilities; about $3 billion in investment losses; and about $2 
billion in actuarial charges. 
[On] April 30, [2009,] the PBGC’s investment portfolio consisted of 
30 % equities, 68 % bonds, and less than 2 % alternatives, such as 
private equity and real estate. All the agency’s alternative 
investments [were] inherited from failed pension plans. . . . 
According to PBGC estimates, auto sector pensions are underfunded 
by about $77 billion, of which $42 billion would be guaranteed in 
the event of plan termination. [The PBGC] also faces increased 
exposure from weak companies across all sectors of the economy, 
including retail, financial services and health care. . . . 
The agency receives no funds from general tax revenues. Operations 
are financed largely by insurance premiums paid by companies that 
sponsor pension plans and by investment returns. 
Id. 
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for a single-life annuity at the age of 65 was $4,500.545 The 
maximum monthly payment for a joint-and-survivor annuity was 
$4,050.546 The PBGC will not pay a participant more than what he 
would have received from his plan. If the PBGC has to pay a 
participant less than what he would have received from his plan and a 
QDRO lacks a provision that specifies how an alternate payee is to 
share in the PBGC payments, then the alternate payee could receive 
nothing from the PBGC. A properly drafted QDRO should include a 
provision stating that in the event the PBGC takes over a defined-
benefit plan, the percentage difference in the alternate payee’s PBGC 
payment and her original payment will be equal to the percentage 
difference in the participant’s PBGC payment and his original 
payment.547 
It is nearly impossible to find a plan’s model QDRO with a 
provision that addresses what to do in the event that the PBGC takes 
over the plan.548 This is because when the PBGC takes over a plan, 
the plan’s administrator is replaced, so he has no continuing interest 
in what happens after that.549 The parties’ attorneys must provide for 
each party in the event that a PBGC takeover occurs.550 
V. VERIFY THAT THE QDRO IS APPROVED BY THE PLAN 
ADMINISTRATOR 
A nationally known, well-regarded QDRO expert who formerly 
served as a plan administrator observed that between 15% and 20% 
of the time when an order did not qualify as a QDRO, the drafter 
simply gave up.551 It is the drafter’s responsibility—not the plan 
administrator’s—to make the changes necessary to get the order 
qualified and effectuated.552 Failure to do so will result in the 
alternate payee permanently losing her rights to her share of the 
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participant’s benefits.553 This constitutes professional misconduct and 
malpractice.554 Also, it is not enough to just send the plan 
administrator an order for a QDRO determination.555 The drafter has 
to be persistent and follow up with the plan administrator until the 
order is qualified.556 Plan administrators sometimes lose or mislay 
orders waiting to be qualified.557 If this happens and a QDRO is 
never entered, then the alternate payee’s rights will be lost, and it will 
be the lawyer’s fault—not the plan’s.558 Once the order is sent to the 
plan administrator, the attorney should follow up in writing every 
fourteen days until the order is qualified.559 If it does not get qualified 
the first, second, or even the third time, then the attorney must work 
diligently to make the changes necessary to have it qualified.560 Once 
the order is qualified, the attorney should obtain a written 
confirmation from the plan administrator verifying that fact and send 
that writing to the client.561 Remember: the lawyer’s duty is not 
fulfilled until the QDRO is accepted and put into effect.562 
The foregoing are not all of the areas of concern that a domestic-
relations practitioner must consider in drafting or reviewing a QDRO. 
The subject is complex enough that one article could not possibly 
cover every conceivable pitfall or trap for the unwary. The areas 
addressed in this Article, however, are ones that arise quite often. 
CONCLUSION 
As long as people get married in America, people will get 
divorced. On August 23, 1984, the job of the domestic-relations 
practitioner became more complex with the introduction of the 
QDRO. All domestic-relations practitioners must learn the ins and 
outs of QDROs—there is no other choice. The learning curve can be 
steep, but it is not insurmountable. Excellent, user-friendly resources 
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are available,563 and it is my hope that this Article becomes one of 
those resources. Happy QDRO drafting. 
                                                 
 563. CARRAD, supra note 9; SHULMAN, supra note 16; SNYDER, supra 
note 27; U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, The Division of Retirement Benefits 
Through Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, DOL.GOV, 
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2012). 
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